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ABSTRACT
That childhood obesity is an alarming public health problem is
clear and widely appreciated. What is altogether unclear is what our
society should do about it. Some people think the solution lies in
using tort law to sue McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and other corporations.
We reject that notion. Others believe that government should order
specific changes in the behavior of food companies and school
officials—and yet, there is little reason for confidence that these
“command and control” strategies will make a difference.
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Instead, we propose “performance-based regulation” of the food
industry. This is analogous to the approach our country is now taking
with respect to elementary and secondary education (most
prominently in the No Child Left Behind legislation). Schools are not
told how to achieve better educational results, but better outcomes are
demanded of them. This strategy has also been used in the
environmental context to reduce harmful power plant emissions, and
it has been briefly proposed as a way of regulating cigarette
companies.
In this Article, we propose that large firms selling food and drink
that is high in sugar or fat will be assigned the responsibility of
reducing obesity rates in a specific pool of children. A firm’s share of
the overall responsibility will be based on its share of the “bad” food
market, and the children assigned to it will be organized by
geographically proximate schools where obesity rates are currently
above the plan’s nationwide target rate of 8 percent (the actual
childhood obesity rate today is approximately 16 percent). Firms that
fail to achieve their goals will be subject to serious financial penalties.
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INTRODUCTION
In America, obesity1 is a health problem that many classify as an
2
epidemic. Particularly troubling is the level of obesity among
children, which has tripled over the last thirty years.3 That this
problem has escalated to a point requiring action is a fairly
uncontroversial notion. People, however, disagree about what form
the solution should take, and the positions fill a spectrum.

1. “Scientists categorize a person as ‘overweight’ if they have a Body Mass Index (‘BMI’)
greater than 25 kg/m2, and as ‘obese’ if they have a BMI greater than or equal to 30 kg/m2.”
Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645,
1648 n.3 (2004). With respect to children,
The [Institute of Medicine] defines obesity . . . as those having a body mass index [sic]
(BMI) equal to or greater than the 95th percentile of the age- and gender-specific
BMI charts developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); at
risk for obesity is defined as having a BMI between 85th and 95th percentiles. CDC
chose not to include the NHANES III (1988–1994) body weight data in the revised
year 2000 BMI standards for children aged 6 years or older, as these data would have
shifted the BMI curves upwards, erroneously conveying appropriateness to the higher
weights. The CDC uses the terms overweight and at risk for overweight for children
according to the same cut-off points.
Eileen Salinsky, Effects of Food Marketing to Kids: I’m Lovin’ It?, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 814 (Nat’l
Health Policy Forum), 2006, at 3, available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB814_
FoodMarketing_08-15-06.pdf.
2. In fact, by 1999 the Centers for Disease Control had already termed America’s issue
with obesity to be an epidemic. Obesity Epidemic Increases Dramatically in the United States:
CDC Director Calls for National Prevention Effort, UPDATE (Ctr. Disease Control, Atlanta,
Ga.), Oct. 26, 1999, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r991026.htm (“A
growing obesity epidemic is threatening the health of millions of Americans in the United
States.”).
3. Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1649; Progress in Preventing Childhood Obesity: How
Do We Measure Up?, REP. BRIEF (Inst. of Med.), Sept. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.iom.
edu/Object.File/Master/36/984/11722_reportbrief.pdf (“Over the past 30 years, the obesity rate
has nearly tripled for children ages 2–5 years (from 5 to 14 percent) and youth ages 12–19 years
(from 5 to 17 percent), and quadrupled for children ages 6–11 years (from 4 to 19 percent).”).
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Many people firmly believe the answer lies with parental
4
accountability. Some in this camp hold to the idea that parents have
an obligation to take control of their own children’s health, and that
society should not use government to interfere with (and perhaps
even undermine) that responsibility.5 To the extent that parents are
now understood to be failing their children, this viewpoint argues for
reliance on decentralized societal forces to nudge parents to better
perform their duty: pressures from extended family members and
friends, changes in the food and exercise markets, and changed social
norms about obesity that may well arise in response to increased
public awareness of the problem.6 Others in the inaction camp simply
conclude that no proposed official interventions will make things any
better, that they all are likely to cost a lot, and that, because of
unanticipated consequences, some could potentially make matters
worse.7
Although others think that the government should indeed play a
role, they think that it has played the wrong role so far. They do not
like the way agricultural food subsidies work (promoting the
production of high fructose corn syrup, for example);8 they do not like
the way children are fed through the national school lunch program;9
they do not like the political clout that agribusiness has with

4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Obesity Policy Choices: What (Not) to Do About Obesity:
A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366 (2005) (“As one might expect, the
causes and consequences of obesity are not a matter of settled and undisputed truth. In light of
that uncertainty, we should be very skeptical of any effort to solve this matter by government
intervention, whether in the form of regulation, taxes, or liability rules.”).
5. See id.
6. See Jeffrey P. Koplan, Preface to INST. OF MED., PROGRESS IN PREVENTING
CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HOW DO WE MEASURE UP? xi, xi (2006) (“Preventing childhood
obesity will involve changes in social norms . . . .”).
7. See generally Paul Campos, The Legalization of Fat: Law, Science and the Construction
of a Moral Panic (Univ. of Colo. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 0616, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902693 (arguing that there is not sufficient
scientific evidence that weight loss strategies significantly improve health).
8. See generally Josh Miner, Market Incentives Could Bring U.S. Agriculture and Nutrition
Policies into Accord, 60 CAL. AGRIC. 8 (2006), available at http://calag.ucop.edu/0601JFM/pdfs/
AgPolicy.pdf (proposing that the USDA promote healthful eating by cutting back on
commodity support payments—for instance, those that subsidize corn, which is grown largely to
produce high-fructose corn syrup—and diverting those funds into food stamp programs that
would facilitate the purchase of minimally processed fruits, vegetables, and whole grain
products).
9. See Michele Simon, Money, Politics, Garbage, and School Lunch (August 25, 1998),
available at http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/4.17/980825-lunch.html (last visited April 14,
2007).
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regulatory agencies like the United States Department of Agriculture
10
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and more.
For those in this camp, perhaps the most important first step would
be for government to quit doing the bad things it now does.
Yet, many have concluded that government has an affirmative
11
role to play with respect to childhood obesity, although they are very
much divided over what that should be. For example, after
acknowledging the human frailties of parents and their children, some
urge government to make efforts to inform the public about healthy
eating and healthy activities.12 But, they argue, governmental action
going beyond the informational and educational functions would be
13
too oppressive.
Others are looking for a much more robust governmental
14
response. They question the effectiveness of measures such as
calorie disclosures at fast-food restaurants, better labels on grocery
store products, nutrition education in public schools, and the like.15
They do not necessarily oppose requiring such measures, but rather
they predict that these devices will be inadequate to solve the
problem.16 We believe this concern is compelling, given mounting
evidence that our food choices are not truly our own and are likely to
remain that way as long as we live in a world of food advertising,
promotion, and increased portion size.

10. E.g., Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco Litigation
to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 84 (2006) (“Food companies are a
powerful lobby in Washington, make campaign contributions, and actively seek to influence
food and nutrition professionals by funding their research or hiring them as consultants. Food
company executives and [USDA] officials often have close relationships, and in some cases,
they switch roles over time.”).
11. See, e.g, M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J.
1335, 1351–58 (2005).
12. See, e.g., id. at 1353–54 (“[P]ublic health authorities ought to bring their credibility and
resources to the task of transforming public understanding of food and fitness matters.”).
13. See, e.g., id. at 1338 (“[Government command and control intervention] is at odds with
our core beliefs and unlikely to produce public health success.”).
14. See, e.g., Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1723 (“As misgivings [about the food
industry] grew and individuals began to take seriously the possibility that fast food was
exercising more influence over our consumption habits than we had realized, an idea was born:
force the industry to change, whether through regulation or lawsuits.”).
15. See, e.g., id. at 1675–89 (arguing that food companies are able to manipulate external
psychological cues that cause unhealthy eating decisions even where good information is
provided to consumers).
16. See, e.g., id. at 1791 (“Labeling regulations likely serve a palliative function, but they do
not get to the root of the problem . . . .”).
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This concern leads advocates to call for stricter regulatory
17
intervention. Some examples of proposed action are (1) eliminating
certain food items from school vending machines;18 (2) requiring
19
schools and workplaces to include healthier menu items; (3) sharply
restricting the inclusion of trans fats in foods prepared by food service
establishments;20 (4) limiting the density of fast-food restaurants near
21
facilities where children gather; (5) forbidding the retail sale of
22
certain junk food to children; (6) eliminating the advertising of sweet
or high fat foods in connection with children’s television programs;23
24
(7) upgrading school lunches so that they are healthier; (8) requiring
cities to subsidize grocery stores that sell fresh fruits and vegetables in

17. For a recent summary of a wide range of potential government interventions to attack
the obesity problem, see generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier
Lifestyles and Prevent Obesity, 297 JAMA 87 (2007). Most of the ideas that Gostin discusses are
command-and-control strategies.
18. Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2603 (2006) (“The policies of school districts have been criticized for
contributing to what researchers describe as a ‘toxic environment’ for children: about 60 percent
of U.S. middle schools and high schools sell soft drinks from vending machines on campus,
although this is likely to change under guidelines recently established by the beverage industry
to curtail such sales by 2010.”) (citations omitted).
19. Gostin, supra note 17, at 87–88.
20. New York City recently enacted a regime that prohibits restaurants from preparing
food with more than a minimal amount of trans fat. Notice from the N.Y. Board of Health on
the Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.08) to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code
(Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoptionhc-art81-08.pdf.
21. See James F. Sallis & Karen Glanz, The Role of Built Environments in Physical Activity,
Eating, and Obesity in Childhood, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 2006, at 89, 97.
22. Banning the sale of junk food near schools would facilitate restrictions of advertising
near schools because the regulated commercial speech would no longer concern lawful activity.
See Randolph Kline et al., Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food Marketing and
Consumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603,
611–13 (2006) (“If a product cannot be lawfully sold, then the First Amendment, via Central
Hudson, does not protect the advertising of the product.”).
23. See Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating
Fast Food Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity
Epidemic, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 457–58 (2004); see also Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2605
(“[T]here would be less difficulty today in establishing an association between food advertising
and children’s eating habits and obesity.”). Indeed, “[t]he results of recent opinion polls indicate
that a majority of Americans believe that the government should be involved in fighting obesity,
particularly by regulating the marketing of ‘junk foods’ to children.” Mello et al., supra note 18,
at 2602 (citations omitted).
24. See generally Simone A. French, Pricing Effects on Food Choices, 133 J. NUTRITION
841S, 843S (2003) (proposing that schools encourage healthier lunch choices by raising the
prices of high-fat foods and lowering the prices of low-fat foods).
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25
low income areas; (9) assuring all children safe access to parks and
26
bicycle paths; and (10) requiring schools to increase the duration and
intensity of physical education.27
What we want to emphasize is that, by and large, these
recommendations are for what we would term “command-andcontrol” regulation. Proposals like these rest on the belief that
professional public health experts know how the regulated parties
should behave, and so the point of regulation is both to spell out that
behavior and enforce effectively the specified obligations.
We should also mention here that other advocates believe the
solution to childhood obesity, at least initially, lies in courtrooms
rather than legislatures or regulatory agencies. These advocates
would like to see already-obese plaintiffs have access to courts
through a novel cause of action sounding in negligence or products
liability.28
We count ourselves among those who seek government action,
but we are not proposing the command-and-control approach, and we
29
are not keen on litigation or other possible interventions as the
solution. Instead, we believe that a system of performance-based
regulation (PBR) holds greater promise for dealing with the obesity
crisis by imposing duties on the food and beverage industry that
contain an appropriate balance of firmness and flexibility.
In this Article we lay out in detail a scheme of performancebased regulation as a way of combating America’s childhood obesity
problem. In a nutshell, our proposal assigns large firms that sell food
or drink containing high levels of sugar or fat the responsibility for

25.

LISA M. FELDSTEIN ET AL., CAL. DEP’T HEALTH SERVS., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A TOOLKIT ON LAND USE AND HEALTH 4-9 to -11 (2006), available at
http://healthyplanning.org/ecdev_toolkit/EcDevToolkit.pdf.
26. See generally John J. Librett et al., Local Ordinances that Promote Physical Activity: A
Survey of Municipal Policies, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1399 (2003) (discussing local policies
affecting both children and adults).
27. See generally Andrew Smith & Stephen Bird, From Evidence to Policy: Reflections on
Emerging Themes in Health-Enhancing Physical Activity, 22 J. SPORTS SCI. 791, 796–97 (2004)
(arguing for a physical education curriculum to encourage physically active modes of
transportation).
28. See Samuel J. Romero, Comment, Obesity Liability: A Super-Sized Problem or a Small
Fry in the Inevitable Development of Product Liability?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 239, 277–78 (2004).
“At times the mere threat of litigation is enough to induce an industry to change its ways.”
Alderman & Daynard, supra note 10, at 85. Some researchers, however, believe “it is not likely
that food personal injury cases would be successful at this time.” Id. at 86.
29. See infra Part III.

AND REDEVELOPMENT:
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reducing obesity rates in a specific pool of children. The basis for a
firm’s share of the overall responsibility will be its share of the “bad”
food market, and the children assigned to it will be organized by
geographically proximate schools where obesity rates are above the
plan’s nationwide target rate of 8 percent. Participating firms will
have ten years to reduce the obesity rate in their assigned schools by
more than 50 percent, and will face substantial penalties starting at
the end of the fifth year if they fail to meet the regulatory goals.
Part I of this Article explains PBR as a regulatory strategy and
compares it with a range of other approaches to the childhood obesity
issue. Part II justifies the application of PBR to the food industry.
Part III argues the superiority of PBR over tort law for dealing with
childhood obesity. Part IV then lays out our proposal in detail. Parts
V and VI respectively discuss the politics entailed in implementing
the plan and the compliance strategies firms would likely adopt.
Finally, Part VII highlights alternative PBR strategies for combating
obesity.
We concede at the outset that more data would permit us to
improve features of our plan, and we imagine there will be disputes
over the plan’s precise parameters even among those who favor our
approach. But we consider it essential to specify our proposal in some
detail because we have found that when we briefly present the idea,
most people instinctively conclude that it is impractical, whatever its
theoretical attractiveness, its moral force, or its political prospects.
(Although some estimate the latter to be close to zero currently, this
does not trouble us for now, as we are only at the point of launching
our idea into the policy arena.)
I. ABOUT PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION
A. Compared with Command-and-Control Regulation
To better explain what we mean by PBR, we will first contrast it
with command-and-control regulation. Suppose that the regulator
aims to address the amount of pollution in the air. With commandand-control regulation, it might direct factories to install certain filters
on their pipes that spew pollutants into the atmosphere—filters that
the regulator believes will best reduce the factory’s contribution to air
pollution levels. In deciding what remedial measure(s) to order,
regulators are likely not only to take into account the cost of the new
filters and their effectiveness, but also to compare that choice with
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other options, such as ordering the factory to use different fuels or to
alter the ingredients it uses in production. In the end, the regulator
tries to order the socially optimal solution, all things considered.
Similarly, in the arena of worker health and safety, a regulator
could require a factory to make all of its employees wear face masks
for certain tasks, in the hopes of best reducing the incidence of
respiratory disease. Again, the regulator might have considered
requiring certain air ventilation systems at the workplace or
precluding the use of certain chemicals in making some products. The
assumption underlying such a regulatory scheme is that the expert
regulators can determine the optimal solution to the problem at hand
and then order the relevant actors to comply.
Within the context of childhood obesity, one frequently touted
command-and-control example is a ban on the sale of sweetened
beverages in public schools, based on expert determination that this
supply-curtailment strategy would reduce obesity rates.30
By contrast, PBR does not tell the relevant actors how to behave
in solving the problem. It does not order enterprises to force their
workers to use masks or to put filters of a certain sort on their
smokestacks (or to pull their Cokes and Pepsis from school cafeterias
and vending machines). Instead, PBR tells a firm or industry what its
outputs or results should be with regard to a certain problem. Then,
the regulated party itself has the responsibility of figuring out how
best to achieve the required performance. In the environmental
regulation scenario, for example, a factory might be told to reduce its
emission rate of a certain pollutant to X parts per billion. It would
then have to determine how to best effectuate this outcome. It might
add filters, or it might do something else. Similarly, in the workersafety example, a factory might be required to reduce the incidence of
respiratory diseases to a certain level. Perhaps face masks are the
right solution, but the factory would be free to solve the problem
using other strategies, including changing the materials with which
workers come into contact or reducing the number of hours each
worker is exposed to the materials. So, too, as we will explain in

30. Judge Richard Posner supports antiobesity measures aimed at reducing consumption of
soft drinks by children, as “[s]oft drinks have virtually no nutritional content (unlike foods rich
in cream or butter), and recent studies indicate that they are a significant factor in obesity . . . .”
Richard Posner, The Fat Tax—Posner’s Comment, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG, Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/10/the_fat_taxposn.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2007).
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31
detail, applying PBR to childhood obesity would mean, under our
proposal, ordering the food and beverage industry to take steps to
reduce obesity prevalence rates, but leaving it up to them to figure
out the best way of achieving that outcome.
The central justification underlying PBR is that when
government regulators use command-and-control regulation, they too
often make the wrong choice. They select a solution that is more
costly than necessary or one that is less effective than another. They
often order yesterday’s technology instead of tomorrow’s.
Government frequently imposes nonoptimal regulatory requirements
because the relevant regulator all too often is neither sufficiently
informed about current alternatives nor the right party to work out,
or even be on top of, more effective solutions in the future. By
contrast, PBR counts on the idea that the regulated party can either
use its repository of information and experience, or draw on that of
others, to develop the cheapest, most efficient, and most effective way
to accomplish the regulator’s goal.
But PBR does not merely lie back and wait for the market to
bring about the socially desired change. Instead, PBR selects the
party it thinks is responsible for the problem and well situated to
solve it, and then imposes on that party the obligation to do so. PBR
is not simple. It requires deciding who the appropriate subject of
regulation is and what level of performance is necessary. On top of
that, it is also necessary to figure out how to measure compliance and
what penalties to impose for noncompliance. Yet, most of these
elements are broadly similar to the requirements of command-andcontrol regulation. There, too, the regulator has to decide, for
example, which polluters to target, what to order them to change,
how to decide whether they have done so, and what to do about it if
they have not. Hence, although some aspects of the regulatory
process may be more problematic than others depending upon the
approach, the central difference is best captured by the distinction
between regulating inputs and outcomes.

B. Compared with Participatory Regulation
PBR and command-and-control regulation are by no means the
only strategies available to regulators. For example, a quite different

31.

See infra Part IV.
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32
regulatory strategy rests on the notion of participation. Here, the
regulator requires participation in an industry’s decisionmaking by
those directly affected by it. For example, workers themselves might
have a voice in deciding how to enhance worker safety at a specific
enterprise. In the case of environmental regulation, the individuals
living in the surrounding community might have input into how the
factory deals with the pollution problem.33 And in the childhood
obesity area, food and beverage companies might be required to meet
and confer with consumer advocates for public health regarding the
ingredients in their products, the way they are marketed, and the way
the public is informed about their healthy or unhealthy attributes.
Under this approach, the regulator tells firms neither what they
must achieve nor how they are to do things. Instead, the regulator
requires the firms to open themselves up to input from parties—other
than the regulator—who may be harmed by the firms’ activities and
whose interests the regulator is seeking to further. This is a “process”
solution, and the justification underlying it is that by giving voice to
the social interests at stake, the regulated enterprises will become
more socially responsible.
As with PBR, this approach is based on the belief that the
regulator alone cannot determine the socially correct solution, either
for the reasons already given, or because there are values at stake
that the regulator cannot sensibly weigh.
Of course, the way any participatory solution plays out might
well turn on precisely the form the required participation takes. Must
the firm only listen to the participants? In precisely what forums must
the participants be heard? Who decides who the participants are?
What leverage points are the participants given to press an industry to
act upon their views?
Obviously, a recognized labor union operating under a collective
bargaining agreement might well be more effective in promoting
worker safety through its members’ participation in the firm’s safety
program than might a firm-appointed committee with no powers to

32. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance
of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1104–15 (2005) (discussing participatory
regulation of workplace safety).
33. See generally Charles F. Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism: How
Communities Are Quietly Refashioning Environmental Regulation, 24 BOSTON REV. 4 (1999)
(proposing greater local community input in the environmental regulatory process through a
“rolling-rule” regime).
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call a strike if needed. But participants do not necessarily need to
have that sort of union power, at least if they are able to mobilize,
say, worker and public opinion on behalf of their position.
Other forms of participant leverage are also imaginable.
Consider, for example, the role of so-called “outside directors” on
corporate boards of directors. Today’s “outside directors” are mainly
viewed as having the duty to prevent director and executive selfdealing to the detriment of shareholders, and to ensure that executive
compensation is not extraordinarily excessive. But one could at least
imagine an outside director, or several, with the obligation to look out
for interests of other constituents, including workers, consumers, and
third parties impacted by enterprise externalities.
For now, our point is only to contrast the underlying assumptions
of participation and PBR. With PBR, outcomes are specified, not
processes. Maybe firms subject to PBR will choose to create their
own participatory structure, at least if they think that will help them
better achieve their outcome target. But that is a decision for the
regulated party to make.
C. Compared with Management-Based Regulation
Next, we wish to note another method of regulation, termed
“management-based.” We view this as a different sort of “process”
regulation. Under this approach, the regulated firms or industries are
merely required to design proposals for solving the identified
problems, and then to implement those proposals.34 Unlike PBR, the
regulator does not specify the level of improvement; nor does the
regulator dictate the nature of the solution, as would be the case in
command-and-control regulation.
Management-based regulation is a kind of “soft law” that
demands participation of a different sort. Here, either single firms or
groups of them must work with the regulator, putting forward their
35
way to attack the social problem identified by the regulator. For

34. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 694 (2003).
35. Although not strictly “management-based,” some people favor the strategy of selfregulation. For example, one article observes:
[T]he success of government regulation of the food industry will probably fall short of
what industry could accomplish alone if it were strongly motivated to do so. Efforts to
encourage self-regulation and corporate responsibility could go far toward improving
the healthfulness of foods sold, provided the industry responses heed the limits of
antitrust law and do not displace meaningful external regulation.
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example, electric utility companies and automakers might be asked
what they propose to do, either jointly or separately, to solve the air
pollution problem. Or firms that use polyvinyl chloride might be
asked to develop a plan to reduce or eliminate the health problems it
causes plant workers. Or food and beverage companies might be
asked to put forward and then comply with their own plans to reduce
childhood obesity.
Under this scheme, the regulator might have the power to
question the proposed solution, to publicize its shortcomings if any,
and so on. But the regulator cannot insist on a different input solution
or on certain outcomes. The potential benefits of this approach are
that it may further government-industry harmony in pursuit of the
public interest as well as increase the likelihood of compliance
without need for strong enforcement. Of course, it risks achieving a
socially insufficient solution. In this respect, PBR mandates more
stringent compliance mechanisms than management-based
regulation. Yet PBR, like management-based regulation, also relies
on those causing the problem to figure out how best to solve it.
D. Compared with Tort Law
36
Tort law is yet another possible regulatory strategy. Simply put,
tort law threatens automakers, for example, with legal liability if they
fail to take socially desirable precautions that would make their cars
safer and thereby reduce harm now arising from motoring. This
threat of civil liability is supposed to promote safety on the theory
that a car company will both realize and act on the fact that it will
often be cheaper to make product improvements than to incur the
costs of liability. These costs include not only the monetary damages
the firm would have to pay to successful victims, but also defendant
litigation costs (most importantly legal fees and the time that firm
employees have to put in defending the case), as well as the cost of
any bad publicity that might arise from being successfully sued.

Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2607. Similarly, in the area of children’s television, although
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One of the advantages claimed for tort law is that it does not
require government regulators of the usual sort. Instead, private party
victims serve to police the conduct of those who would be the object
of other sorts of public regulation. Moreover, if tort law works well in
its deterrence role, then safety gains occur almost by magic, seemingly
without governmental interference at all. Of course, if people actually
sue, then the judicial branch is called into play.
Basic tort doctrine comes in two forms—fault-based (or
negligence) liability and strict liability. And, on closer examination, it
turns out that there are significant parallels between negligence-based
tort law and command-and-control regulation, on the one hand, and
between strict liability tort law and PBR, on the other.
1. Negligence and Command-and-Control Regulation. In the
negligence regime, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and that this breach
legally caused the plaintiff’s injury and resulting damages. To prove a
breach, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted
unreasonably. This means that the plaintiff bears the burden of
coming up with a convincing explanation as to what reasonable
measures the defendant should have taken.
The precautions required by the negligence regime are the
counterpart to the precautions required by command-and-control
regulation. In both cases, an agency of government tells the regulated
parties how they should act. That is, a public body is deciding on
behalf of society which safety measures ought to be taken and which
need not be.
To be sure, there are distinctions between the two systems.
Perhaps most importantly, command-and-control regulation relies
upon expertise of the agency in charge. American tort law, by
contrast, relies on a combination of generalist judges and nonexpert
jurors. Yet, this distinction should not be exaggerated. Negligence law
expects triers of fact to become educated about the competing views
of what precautions are appropriate through the adversarial system
that underlies American tort litigation. Hence, just as car companies
and auto safety consumer groups are likely to present competing
views to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
as to what sort of bumpers or air bags should be required of motor
vehicles, so, too, are those same voices likely to be heard through
witnesses called by both sides in a tort case concerning whether the
defendant placed the gas tank in an unsafe location. Perhaps, in the
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end, agency officials may be better able to decide which side has the
more convincing argument; and, in fact, if an agency has already
made a relevant decision, the tort system will typically defer to it in
deciding what the reasonable precautions are in the situation before
it. Yet, agencies sometimes impose only minimum requirements, not
optimal ones, and when that is the case, tort law could be more
accurate in reflecting the socially desired course of action. To be sure,
jurors (and even judges) might be quite unsophisticated and unduly
influenced by courtroom theatrics; but then, agencies may be unduly
influenced by the political power of the business community and the
agency capture that occurs when friends of the regulated parties take
on agency roles.
A second seemingly key distinction between the two systems
concerns the moment at which government steps in to decide the
socially proper behavior for the regulated party to take. Commandand-control regulation relies on ex ante announcements of how firms
should act, although agencies can, of course, alter their decisions over
time as technology changes, values change, more information comes
to light, and so on (although they typically only apply their
requirements on a going forward, or prospective, basis). Negligence
law, by contrast, depends on ex post determinations of what firms
should have done, decisions that are, in a sense, applied retroactively.
Yet, too much should not be made of this distinction either.
After all, firms often have a good idea in advance as to what precisely
tort law will require of them given what it required in prior similar
cases, notwithstanding the fact that, like agencies, the common law of
torts can adjust the rules over time to reflect changing social
understandings of what is reasonable. To be sure, if a potential tort
defendant can figure out a way to avoid accidents it will not be sued,
and in that event its precautionary strategy will not be second-guessed
by a jury as occurs when someone is injured and a negligence case is
brought. Nonetheless, those who create risks know that if someone is
injured, their conduct is subject to public examination, and the legal
system may well decide that they failed to act in a socially appropriate
and safe manner by not taking X precaution. Similarly, in commandand-control regimes, the regulated party risks being told by the
relevant agency that it acted irresponsibly by failing to take X
precaution.
Third, of course, the penalty structure of the two regimes differs,
with negligence law requiring payments to victims and command-andcontrol regimes imposing public penalties. Moreover, the amount of
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the public penalty will depend most likely on the seriousness of the
failure to comply, whereas the private “penalty” imposed by tort law
is normally a function of how much harm the victim happened to have
suffered, and the same failure to take proper precautions can often
yield a very wide range of harms. Yet, even here, some factors work
to narrow this difference. For one thing, the variability in the harm
suffered by individual victims tends to average out, either because the
defendant injures several people over time, or because the purchase
of liability insurance distributes the cost over all the insureds. For
another, the availability of punitive damages in tort law permits this
scheme to threaten, and if need be, actually penalize, grave
misconduct in ways that tend to reflect its egregiousness.
A final point concerns the difference in enforcement. Mere
failure to implement the socially appropriate measures will not
invoke tort law. Resultant harm is also required. By contrast, in
command-and-control regulation schemes, a firm is subject to
noncompliance penalties regardless of whether anyone has actually
suffered injury. Yet, once more, there may be less of a difference here
than first appears, given that regulators often do not have sufficient
staffing to police compliance with their orders, and, as a result, they
often only take action to deal with noncompliers after a mishap has
occurred.
In the end, whatever one thinks of these differences, the core
commonality remains—that both negligence law and command-andcontrol regimes focus on how people should act to further public
safety.
2. Strict Liability and Performance-Based Regulation.
In
contrast to negligence, a regime of strict liability in tort does not
require a finding of unreasonableness on the part of the defendant. In
fact, that is its defining characteristic. This means that if strict liability
applies to the case, the victim need not investigate what alternative
actions, precautions, or technologies the defendant should have
implemented to avoid the harm. The victim is entitled to
compensation simply because there was a bad outcome.
Here lies the parallel with PBR. With PBR, the regulatory
regime cares about outcomes, and not specific ways of achieving
them. Put differently, in both of these regimes the regulator does not
interfere with the firm’s mode of operation. The firm decides what
precautions to take to avoid strict liability in tort, just as the firm
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decides how to comply with the outcome demanded by PBR to avoid
PBR penalties for failing to achieve that outcome.
Part of the appeal of both PBR and strict liability, then, is the
assumption that the firm has (or has access to) superior information,
experience, and flexibility, and is thus better equipped not only to
deploy the best methods for reducing harm today but also to
experiment with various approaches to avoid harm more effectively
in the future. In this respect, both might be viewed as technology
37
forcing.
At the same time, both strict liability and PBR contain a similar
risk. They both depend upon properly identifying the party that is
indeed best able to figure out what are the most appropriate
precautions to take, or, as Guido Calabresi emphasized in the
38
accident (and tort) setting, deciding who is the cheapest cost avoider.
Put differently, under command-and-control regulation and
negligence, the government agency decides what actions parties
should take, whereas under PBR and strict liability, the government
agency decides who should be delegated the responsibility to decide
what those actions should be. And, of course, the regulator (whether
an agency or legislature in PBR, or a judge in strict liability) might
pick the wrong party to subject to the regulation.
Nevertheless, that is not necessarily fatal. Firms subject to either
strict liability or PBR can find others with whom they can contract to
figure out safer practices, or the targets of the regulation can provide
financial or other incentives for other parties to change their
behavior. And although this may increase the cost of getting to the
socially desirable outcome, it is a matter of “as compared to what.” If
the comparison is with negligence law and command-and-control
regimes, what needs to be weighed in the balance is the risk that the
agency or the jury will specify the wrong precaution.
Although it is true that tort law relies primarily upon fault-based
liability and not strict liability, strict liability applies in at least three
important areas, and they nicely illustrate situations in which the law
is arguably quite sensible in delegating to the relevant enterprises the
obligation to figure out the best way to avoid injury. These are (1)

37. For the general argument on this point, see Justice Roger Traynor’s famous concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (1944).
38. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135–73 (1970) (detailing a “general
deterrence approach” to accident liability allocation that would place costs with the actor that
could have most cheaply avoided the accident).
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mismanufactured products that come off the assembly line containing
harmful defects (e.g., the occasional exploding beverage bottle); (2)
fairly uncommon activities that nonetheless contain the potential of
great harm (e.g., dynamite blasting); and (3) the vicarious
responsibility of employers for the misconduct of their employees,
thereby avoiding a determination of whether the employer
inadequately supervised or trained, or improperly hired, the
individual whose fault brought about the harm.
Later, we will explain why it is that, if one wants to attack
childhood obesity with an outcomes-based scheme, it makes more
39
sense to develop a PBR regime than to impose strict liability in tort.
We should also note in passing that some people support tort
law, not because they are convinced of its ability to change corporate
behavior through the threat of liability, but rather because they
believe that discovery rules and public trials combine to force
corporate misconduct that otherwise might remain secret into the
open.40 We acknowledge that the success of tort litigation in exposing
bad behavior of food and beverage companies may improve the
political prospects of adopting PBR. Yet, that sort of interim
objective is not our focus here.
E. Compared with Subsidies and Taxes
Finally, another way to create incentives for individuals or firms
to change behavior is to make it cheaper or more expensive for them
to act in certain ways—most directly by offering subsidies or imposing
taxes. This approach differs from command-and-control regulation by
leaving it up to the market and its participants to play out the
consequences of the increase and/or decrease in cost caused by the
governmental intervention. Although this approach assumes that
taxes or subsidies will ultimately alter consumer behavior, it differs
from PBR because it does not specify any particular outcome.
PBR penalizes a firm (analogous to a tax) only if it fails to
achieve a regulatory target. Hence, PBR (more akin to tort law) relies
more on the threat of a tax than actually imposing the tax. When
government employs a tax strategy, the party subject to the tax has to

39. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems and the Regulatory Benefits
of Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 271, 272 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
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figure out how to respond to this cost increase—most likely, by
raising the price of what it is selling. Under PBR, firms could also
elect to raise prices as a way of meeting their performance goals. Yet
that is but one of the options available to them.
F. Examples of Performance-Based Regulation
In various forms, PBR has been implemented in a number of
different areas. In this Section, we detail two important examples
from the fields of education and the environment to illustrate salient
features of, and typical problems faced by, this method of regulation.
1. No Child Left Behind. The No Child Left Behind Act41
(NCLB) is a piece of federal legislation inspired by standards-based
education reform movements in a number of states, most notably in
42
Texas. NCLB mainly applies to states and school districts receiving
Title I federal funds, by requiring states to:
1. set standards for academic content and student achievement,
to establish a state’s baseline for adequate education,
43
applicable to all schools and students in the state;
2. create standardized tests aligned with these standards;44
3. report the results of these tests, broken down by relevant
45
ethnic and socioeconomic subpopulations;
4. develop “annual yearly progress” goals to ensure that each
subpopulation can meet the state’s standards within twelve
46
years;
5. produce “report cards” ranking each subpopulation’s
performance on state standardized tests, for each school
under the local educational agency’s (LEA’s) control, and
develop an overarching accountability system to help schools
meet their performance targets;47

41. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as
amended primarily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
42. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the
Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1721 (2003).
43. Id. at 1722.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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6. provide awards for schools that “significantly closed the
achievement gap” between students from different ethnic
48
groups;
7. create opportunities for meaningful involvement of the
parents of participating children.49
Although the NCLB is most akin to PBR, it also contains aspects
that are arguably “management-based” (i.e., the development of
“annual yearly progress” goals), and “participatory” (i.e.,
opportunities for parental involvement). In addition, because NCLB
also contains various directives to the school districts, it may also
contain some aspects of the traditional command-and-control
regulation. But the most important feature of NCLB is that it requires
schools to achieve academic results, and it leaves it up to schools to
decide how to reach those outcome goals (at least at the beginning).
Moreover, various consequences flow from failing to meet the
mandated goals (what might be termed penalties, so far as schools
and school districts are concerned). Hence, overall, NCLB nicely
typifies the PBR approach.
At the same time, we believe that NCLB also reveals certain
pitfalls of PBR, some of which, in our view, could be avoided by
reforming NCLB itself. Others might be unavoidable in the field of
public education, but not when it comes to other providers of goods
or services regulated though PBR. Nonetheless, we think it helpful to
illustrate with NCLB potential key problems with getting PBR right.
a. Properly Specifying the Outcome. The phrase “teaching to
the test” captures one problem with NCLB. The outcomes to which
schools are held accountable may not reflect the most important skills
that students should develop, but, rather, the skills that are simplest
and cheapest to assess.50 For instance, it is expensive to develop a
51
uniform system of evaluation for student writing. So, as a substitute,
student results on multiple-choice grammar tests may serve as a
measure for educational gains.52 Because of the mismatch between the
truly desired social outcome and the measure employed to judge

48. Id. at 1722–23.
49. Id. at 1723.
50. See Richard J. Murnane & Frank Levy, Will Standards-Based Reforms Improve the
Education of Students of Color?, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 401, 407–08 (2001).
51. Id. at 407.
52. Id.
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whether students have learned what they should, schools focus too
53
little on writing. Worse, they may spend even less time on teaching
writing skills than they would have before NCLB, because now they
are focusing on “teaching to the test.”
A different problem with the outcome requirements of NCLB is
54
that the states set them, and not the federal government. Thus, states
have an incentive to set low standards to have their schools “look
good” and to avoid penalties for failures. And, indeed, those states
that imposed “tough” graduation requirements in earlier years are
replacing higher outcome standards with lower ones as the data begin
to show high levels of failure under NCLB. This retreat from the
objectives of PBR can be a recipe for regulatory ineffectiveness.
b. Accurately Determining Whether the Specified Outcomes
Have Been Achieved. Second, some schools may manipulate the test
data they report. Perhaps most outlandishly, classroom teachers
might give students answers to the tests in advance, or change student
answers, to demonstrate better-than-actual educational achievement.
As another example, if the outcome tests only take into account the
scores of general education students, this measure may not capture a
school’s performance with respect to those in special classes, such as
disabled students or those who are still developing competency in the
English language.55 This leads to two difficulties. First, schools are not
held to answer for the quality of education they are affording these
latter sorts of children. In addition, schools may actually shunt other
low-performing students into these alternative programs so that they
do not “drag down” the numbers achieved by the rest of the general
education students.56 As a consequence, the shunted students get
shortchanged, and the school appears to have accomplished more
than it really has.
c. Assuring That the Regulatory Target Is Able to Achieve the
Required Outcomes. Third, there is the capacity problem. Many have
charged that large numbers of public schools serving high-needs
children simply do not have the financial resources to implement the
changes necessary to meet the performance standards that NCLB has

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 408.
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 42, at 1722.
Murnane & Levy, supra note 50, at 408.
Id.
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57
imposed on them. Also, there is a risk of an unavoidable downward
spiral for an initially failing school. Suppose that, in the first round of
measuring achievement, students attending an altogether
underfunded school fail to meet the required standards. In fact,
meeting these standards would have been unlikely no matter who was
put in charge of the school. But now the school might have an even
tougher time recruiting talented teachers, leading to even worse
results the next year, and so on.58

d. Imposing an Effective Enforcement Mechanism. Finally,
NCLB itself has weak enforcement provisions.59 Even though the law
sets up some obligations for states and school districts, it includes very
little federal monitoring of school progress, and almost no mandatory
enforcement provisions.60 Certain penalties are supposed to flow from
a school’s failure to meet its annual yearly progress, but it is by no
means clear that fear of these penalties will serve as an effective prod
to get a school to perform better. Moreover, some of the penalties
currently seem to be easily ignored in many communities, such as the
requirement that families with students in failing schools be given the
opportunity to send their children to a more successful school in the
district.
Despite its flaws, NCLB (or better, an amended NCLB) does
hold promise for real education reform. By providing a way for
parents to compare the performance of similarly situated schools, as
well as financing school choice under certain circumstances,61 the law
sets up a benchmarking regime among the schools, which has the
62
potential to create a “race to the top.” In addition, a nationwide
movement comprised of multitudinous approaches to improving
educational outcomes—especially for traditionally disadvantaged
groups—creates the opportunity for information pooling. This, in
turn, might give rise to “rapid learning” among successive generations
of reformers.63 In the meantime, at least partially spurred by NCLB,
states themselves are making some progress with standards-based

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 411.
Id.
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 42, at 1724.
Id. at 1724–25.
Id. at 1723–24.
Id. at 1736.
Id.
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reforms. “Standards are becoming more clear; assessments are
64
improving; professional development is becoming more focused.”
To review, despite its potential for improving educational
outcomes for broad classes of children, the problems of NCLB we
have identified illustrate the importance of determining (1) the nature
of the desired outcome (e.g., strong writing skills as compared to
strong achievement on grammar tests); (2) the scope of the regulation
(e.g., all schoolchildren as compared to a gerrymandered subset of
them); (3) the actors best equipped to bring about the desired results;
and (4) the enforcement mechanisms of the regulation.
2. Air Pollution: the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM). Los Angeles has implemented an environmental
scheme to improve air quality that centered on the use of a declining
65
cap in permissible emissions and tradable permits. Under this PBR
approach, the regulator establishes an aggregate level of pollution
that the covered plants may emit in a given area in a given year
(under the assumption that a decline in emissions by those plants will
actually positively impact air quality).66 The regulator then allots
individual plants their own allowable levels of emission.67 If one plant
emits less than its allotment, its owner can sell to another firm the
68
legal right to pollute by this amount. Reciprocally, if a firm wants to
emit more than its allocation, it can do so only if it can find one or
69
more firms with the necessary excess allocation to sell. In
subsequent years, the cap for total emissions declines, thereby
lowering each plant’s allocation.70 Other things equal, in each
subsequent year there will be fewer excess allocations available to
71
buy, making them more expensive. This, in turn, steps up the
pressure on firms to develop newer and cheaper ways of reducing

64. Murnane & Levy, supra note 50, at 413.
65. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 247
(1999).
66. Id. at 237.
67. Id. at 237–38.
68. Id. at 238.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 248.
71. Id.
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emissions, especially if, as is likely, the firms implemented less costly
72
emissions reductions first.
Like other forms of PBR, the regulation here specifies the
outcome—how much pollution will be allowed—and leaves it up to
the regulated industry to figure out the best way to achieve this goal.
Notice that with RECLAIM, the social goal was cast with respect to
the total group of plants in the Los Angeles basin. To be sure,
individual firms had initial outcome targets allocated to them as well.
But, through trading, they could adjust their individual targets, so
long as the covered firms as a whole did not exceed the regulatory
maximum.
There are potential benefits to employing this sort of tradable
permits plan as part of PBR. Most importantly, this approach allows
for firms to take pollution-reduction gains at locations where it is
most efficient to do so. Company X may find that it is cheaper for it
to buy a greater allocation of pollution permits than to reduce
pollution at its site, provided that Company Y can more cheaply
reduce its emissions so that it needs fewer of its allocated permits and
hence has excess permits to sell to Company X. From the overall
perspective, then, the social goal of reduced industry emissions should
happen at the lowest financial cost.
However, a tradable permits scheme arguably has drawbacks.
Perhaps the most important is known as “toxic hot spots.”73 A “toxic
hot spot” occurs when a firm that chooses to buy pollution credits
rather than reducing its emissions ends up buying so many credits that
pollution in the area surrounding the firm is much worse than it
would have been under a command-and-control regulatory scheme.74
Although the overall outcome of the PBR plan may be efficient from
an economic perspective, it is a highly unwelcome result to members
of the community that must bear the negative externalities arising
from the hot spot. Worse, these hot spots are likely to be located in
communities that are economically disadvantaged and politically
powerless.75 This is because the oldest and most polluting plants,

72. See id.
73. Id. at 251.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 254 (“The demographics of this hot-spot area starkly contrast with that of the
metropolitan Los Angeles region. . . . [T]he racial composition of communities [in this area]
ranges from 75 to 90 percent people of color, while the entire South Coast Air Basin has a
population of only 36 percent people of color.”).
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which are the most expensive to make “cleaner,” tend to be in such
76
neighborhoods. The upshot is a distributional consequence that
many find troubling.
Regulators could address this result by requiring neighbors of the
now-clean plants to make payments to those living near the still-dirty
plants. But this is a politically unlikely outcome given the typical
situation. And besides, even that remedy, in effect, allows the
beneficiaries of the clean air to buy up the victims’ desire for clean air
with money, something that the victims may not prefer.
Thus, by specifying the social outcome in terms of aggregate
emissions for a broad geographic area, the regulator may have failed
to take into account the distinct citizen groups that comprise the
subareas within the program’s boundaries. In a sense, then, this
deficiency of a tradable permits scheme is analogous to the NCLB
problem of applying the outcome goals only to general education
students, thereby creating a scheme that may seriously disadvantage
students who are not in that group.
Some researchers say that, in its precise design, RECLAIM has
succeeded only in helping the polluting firms, by lowering the costs
77
associated with environmental compliance. If, as claimed, the
regulator permitted too much pollution at the outset, this could well
have led to many firms finding themselves with excess permits despite
not having made any real effort to reduce their emissions. And it is
then easy to see how a glut of excess permits can reduce the cost of
buying up excess allocations to almost zero. This allows other firms to
acquire pollution permits so cheaply that it undermines any incentive
they might otherwise have had actually to reduce pollution.78 Another
objection to RECLAIM is that the initial allocations to individual
firms were unfair because they were based on incomplete and
inaccurate information, thereby giving unfair advantages to some
79
firms and unfair disadvantages to others.
Perhaps most importantly, this example illustrates how essential
it is for any PBR scheme to properly determine the level of
performance that is to be demanded. The standard must be rigorous,
yet achievable. If it is too lax, it does not produce results, and can
even have perverse effects—firms may pollute more than they would
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
See id. at 235.
Id. at 266.
See id. at 268.
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have under some other regulatory scheme, and with impunity. On the
other hand, if the standard is too stringent, either it could overdeter
some desirable economic activity by driving socially useful firms out
of business or firms could declare the standard unmanageable and
throw up their hands, acquiescing to the penalties. Although the
money generated from the penalties (assuming for now that the
scheme employs financial penalties) can perhaps be put to good use,
the scheme would then have essentially degenerated from a
performance-based regulatory scheme into a simple (Pigovian) tax on
80
the regulated firms, thereby losing the benefits of having the
regulated firms solve the social problem that was the point of PBR in
the first place.81
II. JUSTIFYING APPLYING PERFORMANCE-BASED
REGULATION TO THE FOOD INDUSTRY
Food is a necessary part of life and an important component of
familial, social, and cultural interaction. It is also big business, with
annual U.S. sales approaching $900 billion.82 This year, each
American will consume an average of approximately 25 pounds of
candy,83 about half of which consists of chocolate,84 16 pounds of
85
86
87
chips, 15 quarts of ice cream, 23 pounds of pizza, 16 pounds of

80. A Pigovian tax is “a tax enacted to correct the effects of a negative externality.” N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 780 (2d ed. 2001).
81. For example, the Kyoto treaty on “global warming” envisions sharp national reductions
in carbon emissions. Although it does not specifically promote a tradable permit system like
that of RECLAIM, it does state that signatories will implement policies that will help to correct
market deficiencies and encourage reform in the relevant industries. The tradable permit system
is one way of achieving those results. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
82. INST. OF MED., FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH: THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY? 144 (2006).
83. Nancy Schaaf, Candy: The Trivia and History of Our Favorite Sweets, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT, July 22, 2005, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/6076/candy_the_trivia_and_
history_of_our.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
84. TheChocolateStore.com, Candy Facts, http://www.thechocolatestore.com/candyfacts.
aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
85. Biing-Hwan Lin et al., Fast Food Growth Boosts Frozen Potato Consumption, 24 FOOD
REV. 39, 39 (2001).
86. Patrick O’Connor, Who Scooped Whom: The Great Ice Cream Cone Debate, COLUM.
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2004, http://www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/cns/2004-04-05/655.asp
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
87. Pizza Trivia, http://www.thepizzajoint.com/pizzafacts.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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88
89
french fries, and 150 hamburgers. And although many people
consume these products and are not obese, all of these products
contribute to the obesity problem nonetheless.
Beyond simply putting food and beverages into the market, firms
in this industry spend huge sums promoting the purchase of their
products. Although the total marketing investment by the food,
beverage, and restaurant industries is unknown, “advertising alone
account[ed] for more than $11 billion in industry expenditures in
2004, including $5 billion for television marketing.”90 In addition to
such “measured media marketing,” companies are increasingly
employing unmeasured sales promotion techniques such as
“marketing through product placement, character licensing, special
events, in-school activities, and advergames. In fact, only
approximately 20% of all food and beverage marketing in 2004 was
devoted to advertising on television, radio, print, billboards, or the
Internet.”91
92
Firms direct much of this advertising toward children, and most
of it is for junk food.

The nutritional characteristics of the food advertised in children’s
programming are generally for high-calorie (e.g. high sugar or high
fat) and low-nutrient foods and beverages . . . 44 percent of all food
advertising in a sample of children’s television programming were in
the “fats, oils and sweets” food group, the category of foods
recommended to be the smallest proportion of one’s overall food
93
consumption in the USDA food guidance system.

The food industry also wields a tremendous amount of political
influence.94 “The Center for Responsive Politics estimates that food

88. Foodreference.com, French Fries, http://www.foodreference.com/html/ffrenchfries.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
89. William C. Roberts, Facts and Ideas from Anywhere, 15 BAYLOR U. MED. CENTER
PROC. 237, 239 (2002).
90. INST. OF MED., supra note 82, at 4.
91. Id.
92. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 181 (2002) (noting that the “children’s
television-advertising market . . . accounted for $1 billion” in 1999).
93. INST. OF MED., supra note 82, at 184; see also Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2601
(“American children are exposed to approximately 40,000 food advertisements per year, 72
percent of which are for candy, cereal, and fast food.”).
94. See NESTLE, supra note 92, at 193 (“Soft drink producers . . . blocked proposed
restrictions on sales from vending machines, and fast-food companies won the right to continue
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and agriculture lobbyists spent $52 million in 1998 on issues other
95
than tobacco (on which they spent another $67 million).” Specific
examples include “the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association
[spending] $400,000, the National Pork Producers Council [spending]
$200,000, and Kraft General Foods [spending] $120,000.”96 “[M]ost
food corporations favor Republicans because members of this party
are more likely than Democrats to protect and promote business
interests.”97
Politicians are often willing to support the demands of food
companies because they can defend such policies to their constituents
under the theory of freedom of choice. After all, what politician
would outlaw the great American hamburger or apple pie, if that is
98
what a person chooses to consume?
More and more research, however, is undermining the
assumption that people freely choose what to eat, when to eat, and
99
how much to eat. The academic debate about food choice comprises
two opposing models for decisionmaking, “dispositionism” and
“situationism.” Dispositionism is the belief that a people’s choices are
the result of their character, tastes, and preferences, i.e., their
dispositions. By contrast, situationism holds that people’s choices and
actions are generally influenced more by the surrounding
circumstances and environmental forces, i.e., their situations, than by
their dispositions. In large part, the food industry’s advertising blitz,
retail chain ubiquity, and sharply increasing portion size100 create a

selling items that had to meet nutritional standards only if they were sold as part of
reimbursable school meals.”).
95. Id. at 102.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 106.
98. See Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2605 (“[T]he food, toy, broadcasting, and advertising
industries . . . raised an unprecedented amount of money—$16 million—to fight the [FTC’s]
proposed rules [regulating advertisements aimed at children], and public opinion was
unfavorably disposed to the FTC’s acting as a ‘national nanny.’”).
99. See generally Benforado et al., supra note 1 (arguing that situational influence is an
essential cause of obesity in society); cf. Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2607 (“Over time, a
greater understanding of the environmental influences on food choices should create the
ideological conditions for further regulation. The law is slow to recognize that choices in the
marketplace may not be totally free; the burden will be on researchers to demonstrate that some
forms of communication may impede rather than facilitate informed choices.”).
100. NESTLE, supra note 92, at 26 (“The cost of food is low relative to labor and other
factors that add value. Large portions attract customers . . . because the relative prices
discourage the choice of smaller portions. [T]he larger portions of McDonald’s French fries are
a better buy than the ‘small,’ [being] 40% cheaper per ounce.”); see also French, supra note 24,
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“situation” that compromises the autonomy of food consumers. We
conclude that this latter side of the debate has significant merit.
There is, in addition, the matter of what we view as food
101
subsidies. These come in various forms. The federal government
directly subsidizes certain farming interests in ways that allow them to
keep their prices down and increase quantities consumed. The
subsidy of corn-based sugar products is especially troubling in this
regard, given the enormous quantities of sweetened beverages that
Americans drink. We find it not at all surprising that there is a strong
correlation between increased childhood obesity and increased
consumption of sugar drinks by the young.102
Food manufacturers are also aided by free access to unpatented
new ideas and technologies that government-supported research
produces at universities.103 Again, this keeps food prices lower than
they would otherwise be. On top of that, the price of food does not
internalize the social costs associated with obesity. Some of these
costs are externalized to society at large through the burdens that
obesity puts on the health care system.
To be sure, the obese themselves bear many of the costs of
obesity, and yet this inevitably means a burden on their immediate
families. Besides, given the period between consumption of bad food
and later health consequences of obesity, people are not threatened
with the risks of their conduct in an immediate sense. This is unlike,
say, skiers who are clearly aware of the immediate dangers they face.
As with tobacco products, were the longer term costs of bad food to
consumers vividly presented to them at the time of consumption, one
at 842S (“[R]esearch . . . suggests that people will consume a greater quantity of food or
beverage from a ‘supersize’ serving portion compared with a small portion, especially if the
price per ounce is less.”).
101. NESTLE, supra note 92, at 19; see also MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S
DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 108 (2006) (“Very simply, we subsidize
high-fructose corn syrup in this country, but not carrots.”).
102. NESTLE, supra note 92, at 200 (“[T]he relationship between soft drink consumption and
body weight is so strong that researchers calculate that for each additional [daily] soda
consumed, the risk of obesity increases 1.6 times.”).
103. Though universities themselves patent much government-sponsored research, some
patentable innovations nonetheless slip through and enter the public domain. Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996). Additionally, when
patentable inventions are not at stake, the general advancement of knowledge and scientific
disciplines create externalities benefiting industry. E.g., David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat,
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other
OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 116 (2005).
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would expect that less would be consumed. Although all of these
factors might argue for raising bad food prices, in the absence of that,
they provide yet another justification for imposing PBR on sellers of
bad food.
Even apart from the role of food companies in enticing children
to eat too much, food itself remains a necessary cause of obesity. To
be sure, other factors beyond calorie consumption can play a role in
104
outcomes for individuals—such as exercise and genes. But without
105
high caloric intake, people do not become obese. We think this basis
alone morally justifies requiring the food industry to address the
problem of childhood obesity—just as one might justify requiring the
auto industry to address the problem of highway accidents through
PBR, even if alcohol and driver carelessness also play important
roles. In a similar vein, we can imagine shifting the problem of work
injuries toward a PBR scheme aimed at employers, instead of relying
on the traditional regime that combines workers’ compensation and
occupational health and safety regulation. To those whose first
reaction is that food is only part of the story,106 we want to emphasize
that we are not proposing that the food industry eliminate childhood
obesity, only that it take responsibility for substantially reducing its
incidence.
Whether it would be practical to apply PBR to food producers is
another matter, and the topic to which we turn in Part IV. But, before
setting out the main features of our proposal, we want to
acknowledge two aspects of the obesity problem that make it
especially challenging to attack it by applying PBR to the food
industry.

104. Compare Salinsky, supra note 1, at 6 (“Declines in physical activity also appear
complicit in increasing energy imbalance and obesity in children, but the magnitude of its role is
unclear.”), with David M. Cutler et al., Why Have Americans Become More Obese?, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 93, 104 (2003) (“[T]he most plausible explanation for the rise in obesity involves
increased caloric intake, not reduced caloric expenditure.”).
105. See Salinsky, supra note 1, at 5 (“Total caloric intake has increased substantially over
the past 25 years for preschool children and adolescents, and more modest increases have been
observed for children aged 6–11.”).
106. See, e.g., What Industry Can Do to Respond to Childhood Obesity, FACT SHEET (Inst.
of Med.), Sept. 2006, at 1 (“Market forces may be very influential in changing both consumer
and industry behaviors. All relevant industry stakeholders—including food and beverage
companies, quick serve and full serve restaurants, food retailers, recreation and leisure
companies, entertainment companies, and the media—should share responsibility for
supporting childhood obesity prevention goals.”).
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107

The first relates to causation. Each obese child obviously
consumes many different foods from a variety of brands. Moreover,
some foods are very healthy to eat. For these reasons, it makes no
sense to ask each firm in the food industry to reduce youth
consumption of its products as a way of achieving reduced youth
obesity. And besides, with so many factors at play, it seems
implausible for anyone to measure the reduced childhood obesity
results in children at large from actions taken by individual food
companies. Acknowledging this problem, we have developed a
proposal that takes it into account by matching “bad” food sellers
with specific groups of children.
The second complication is the time lag between cause and
effect. Strategies that firms try out for reducing obesity could take a
rather long time to show results. Moreover, a firm may well combine
several different tactics to combat obesity, and then find it difficult for
108
some time to know which measures are having the most effect.
Indeed, we concede that the general question of expertise in reducing
obesity rates is a difficult one
Were PBR applied to tobacco companies, for example, we are
confident that, just as cigarette makers know how to entice people to
smoke their brands, they could figure out effective ways to reduce
prevalence rates of their specific brands. Although that same point
might be made about food companies, this is not what food
companies will need to do. Indeed, as Part IV explains, because of the
way our proposal connects food companies with the group of children
for whom they are responsible, most of any national reduction in the
consumption of their bad food product will do those firms little good
in meeting their regulatory target, even if, overall, this helps produce
a socially desirable result.
As for figuring out how to reduce obesity in a specific pool of
children, our judgment is that, on balance, large food companies (and

107. See Koplan, supra note 6, at xi (“[L]essons learned from other public health concerns
such as the prevention of youth tobacco use and alcohol consumption can provide insights and
directions for further efforts. However, the solutions to tobacco and alcohol consumption
among our young people cannot be fully replicated due to the complexity of obesity and the
ubiquity of food, sedentary habits, and familiar routines in our culture that contribute to the
problem.”).
108. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE 244
(2005) (“Evaluation of the literature on [childhood obesity] interventions is complicated
because of their variety and the multicomponent nature of their designs, making comparisons of
results difficult.”).
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those they can call on for assistance) are indeed well situated to make
a difference. Still, it is probably appropriate to allow a grace period
before insisting on any obesity-reduction gains, and it may also be
very difficult, at least at the outset, to specify with great confidence
the obesity-reduction gains that the food industry has the capacity to
attain. We concede that a grace period risks both genuine footdragging by the regulated parties, as well as public impatience and
misperception that there is foot-dragging when there might not be. In
the details of our proposal, therefore, we have tried to set the length
of the grace period, the size of the obesity reduction required, and the
structure of the penalties for failure to meet the performance goals in
ways that sensibly balance this related set of uncertainties.
III. WHY PERFORMANCE-BASED
REGULATION INSTEAD OF TORT LAW
Some enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers have sued food companies
for damages on behalf of obese clients, floating what appear to be no
more than trial balloons.109 Under current tort doctrine, because these
lawsuits do not claim that the food the plaintiffs ate was adulterated
(i.e., other than what was intended), strict liability does not apply, so
the claimants have the obligation to prove that the defendants did
something wrong.
Theoretically, a product “design” argument could be advanced.
For example, plaintiffs might fault defendants for having “too much”
fat in the burgers or fries or serving “too large” portions. But these
are not the sorts of claims that are likely to succeed in a product
liability case, regardless of what the public health community thinks
about these matters. So long as there is adequate disclosure, tort law
generally relies on consumers (or parents of child consumers) to
109. See Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1723 n.271 (“[T]here have been ‘10 prominent
cases against the food industry so far, five of which had some success. McDonald’s paid $12
million to settle a complaint that it failed to disclose beef fat in its French fries; Kraft agreed to
stop using trans fats in Oreos; the makers of Pirate’s Booty, a puffy cheese snack, paid $4
million to settle a claim over understated fat grams.’”) (quoting Kate Zernike, Lawyers Shift
Focus from Big Tobacco to Big Food, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at A15). See generally Richard
Daynard, Legal Approaches to the Obesity Epidemic, 13 CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 154 (2003)
(“Substantial bases exist for litigation [against the food industry], which could change public
attitudes toward the industry and induce food companies to improve their behavior.”); Michelle
Mello et al., The McLawsuit: the Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22
HEALTH AFF. 2 (2003) (“Fast-food litigation, no matter what its ultimate outcome in the courts,
could change public attitudes and industry regulation.”); Mello et al., supra note 18 (“The law is
now firmly established as a powerful instrument of public health.”).
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decide what to buy. For example, a lawsuit brought by an individual
hurt in a rollover accident against an automaker under the theory that
the convertible it sold should have had a hard top does not hold much
promise. Neither does one brought against a beer company that
claims that the regular beer a person drank should have had even less
alcohol, and so on.
Hence, the most likely route for these cases to take under current
law would be to base claims on inadequate disclosures, e.g., the
defendant should have, but did not, disclose the fat content of the
product, or the calorie content of the meal, and so on. These are
generally called “warning defect” cases. Plausibly, plaintiffs could also
attempt some claims based on negligent marketing, as was done in
handgun litigation.110
Notice that these sorts of lawsuits depend on convincing the jury
that the defendant should have engaged in some specific behavior
that would have made a difference in terms of the victim’s obesity.
That is why we have described this sort of claim as analogous to
command-and-control regulation. And, although juries might well
decide that the defendant’s product was “defective” in one way or
another because of some warning jurors believe the defendant should
have given, we are somewhat skeptical about whether juries will
make decisions that sensibly further the public health agenda.
In any event, a further enormous problem confronts these sorts
of cases—the causation requirement of tort law, which has two
ramifications here. First, the jury must find that the plaintiff would
have acted in response to the warning in a way different from how the
plaintiff actually behaved. For example, the jury might have to be
convinced that the plaintiff would have eaten less of the defendant’s
product, or eaten it less often, or perhaps not eaten it at all. Although
many jurisdictions follow the “heeding presumption” with respect to
warnings regarding the proper safe handling of products (e.g., to
engage a guard), we believe this presumption would not apply, and
would not sensibly apply, to the sort of disclosures we have
mentioned here. Rather, we believe that the question of whether a
particular plaintiff would have responded to the warning by eating
less of the product or no longer eating it at all can only sensibly be an
individual factual inquiry about that plaintiff.
110. Stephen D. Sugarman, Comparing Tobacco and Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS, supra note
40, at 196, 221.
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Second, even if successful on the first causation prong, the
plaintiff will also have to show that his or her change in behavior with
respect to this product would have made a difference for his or her
obesity in a meaningful way. This, however, raises the problem of
“multiple sources.” Given that nearly everyone eats something of a
varied diet of foods provided by a wide variety of companies, it is
going to be very difficult to show that, say, cutting back on Big Macs
would have much mattered, and even more difficult to prove that the
person would not then have been obese. To be sure, there may be
some eccentric teens who eat virtually only fast food from a single
chain, but any success they might have in getting past the “multiple
sources” problem is not going to do much for the vast majority of
obese children.
Finally, although some obese teens have developed diabetes in
conjunction with their obesity, many others are “only” seriously at
risk of subsequent ill health. For those victims, determining the tort
law damages would be difficult; for plaintiffs with similar problems
(with respect to asbestos, for example), the record of the legal system
111
in reaching sensible solutions is not enviable.
Although current tort law governing the issue is effectively faultbased, imagine for a moment that strict liability in tort applied. In
such a regime, the plaintiff would not have to show what the
defendant should have done. That makes it more like PBR, as we
discussed earlier. Yet, individual causation problems remain. Victims
would still have to show that the defendant’s product(s) caused their
obesity. As a theoretical matter, by threatening food companies with
strict liability for those who become obese from eating their products,
this would give firms an incentive to take actions that would reduce
obesity rates. And, as with PBR, it would be up to firms to decide
how to do that.

111. Professor Ausness describes the difficulties of this type of litigation:
Plaintiffs will find that causation requirements are particularly difficult to overcome.
Duty and proximate cause may also be troublesome. In addition, defendants will try
to characterize the bad eating habits of obese consumers as product misuse. Suppliers
of raw materials and ingredients may be able to transfer liability to the seller of the
finished product by relying on the doctrine of shifting responsibility. Furthermore,
sellers of packaged foods, if properly labeled, are likely to escape liability altogether
by invoking the concept of federal preemption. Restaurants and fast-food vendors
may also be able to raise federal preemption as a defense. Finally, sellers of food
products will seek to reduce their liability by raising conduct-based defenses such as
contributory negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of risk.
Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big Problems
Ahead for “Big Food”?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 843–44 (2005).
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Yet, firms will face something of a problem if most of their
customers are not obese. Think about the analogy to beer companies.
If they were held strictly liable for the consequences of their
customers getting drunk, they could, of course, eliminate alcohol from
their product. But that would be extremely unpopular with the
majority of their customers who do not abuse alcohol. Of course, the
beer companies might devise some way of getting individual abusers
not to consume too much beer, and perhaps habitual beer drinkers
have a brand loyalty that nicely connects each drinker with one beer
company (although, contrary to this picture, we suspect that many
such abusers also drink other sorts of alcohol). For this reason alone,
we find the case-by-case individual lawsuit approach an unpromising
way to deal with childhood obesity, even if strict liability was the law
of the land (which it is not).
Some lawyers might try to avoid some of these problems by
joining several food companies as defendants, and perhaps joining
several obese children as plaintiffs. They might then seek to assign
“market share” liability to the defendants, making each responsible
for a portion of the harm. This was done, for example, in some
pharmaceutical cases in which there were multiple sources of a
harmful drug and victims could not reasonably know which firm
112
provided the actual drug that harmed them. Although applying this
approach to obesity would be a legal stretch, suppose for now the
courts were willing to do so. This begins to make the tort strategy
look much more like the PBR approach to obesity. Yet, there
remains one very large difference.
With the tort approach, the actual social intervention would be
to impose market share damages on the defendants. Reduced obesity
would only come if they responded to such liability by taking actions
intended to preclude future lawsuits by those who are not yet obese.
By contrast, PBR withholds penalties, seeking to push firms to meet
specific outcome goals, which, if they are successful, allows them to
avoid the rough equivalent of tort damages. PBR, therefore, more
directly aims to solve the actual public health problem (instead of
compensating the victims and hoping for socially desirable indirect
responses).

112. See Anita Bernstein, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets of Mothers, in TORTS
STORIES 151, 157–70 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003) (detailing the
hurdles faced by plaintiffs in the diethylstilbestrol (DES) suits against pharmaceutical
companies).
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Moreover, we have designed a better mechanism to achieve that
end. With market share tort liability, firms might well have no good
way of lowering their damages in the future, short of withdrawing
from the business. This goes back to the problem of the usual inability
of determining whether getting Susie to drink fewer Cokes made a
difference for her. Our proposal confronts this problem by linking
bad food sellers to group of students organized by schools. Thus,
under our regime, firms have real world targets, whose progress
toward lowered obesity rates as a group is much more readily
determined, and who form a coherent body of individuals toward
whom a firm can direct its healthier outcomes strategies.113
IV. THE PROPOSAL
A. The General Goal: Reducing Childhood Obesity Prevalence by
About 50 Percent
1. Defining the Desired Outcome—Why Obesity? Our PBR
scheme targets the condition of childhood obesity. If the cost and
difficulty of measuring progress were not relevant considerations, one
might be tempted instead to focus on the broader goal of healthy,
happy children, with weight (or one’s body mass index, which is the
typical measure of obesity) being only an incidental consideration.
Yet, given that the health problems and social hardships associated

113. For other pessimistic appraisals of the prospects of tort litigation, see Brooke Courtney,
Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco? Lessons Learned from Tobacco for Obesity Litigation, 15
ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 64 (2006) (claiming that “litigation alone is currently unlikely to impact
the obesity epidemic in a substantial way”). Indeed, “Sherman Joyce, President of the American
Tort Reform Association, argues that legislation and regulation are more appropriate than
using the courts as a means of addressing the problem of obesity.” Alyse Meislik, Note,
Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: The Obesity Epidemic and Litigation Against the Food
Industry, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 788 (2004). “Normal insurance mechanisms, rather than the
products liability litigation system, are preferable institutions to address the inevitable losses
from widely known inherent product hazards.” David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93
KY. L.J. 377, 422 (2005). “[C]ourts should simply step aside, and legislatures should step up to
limit the most dubious types of inherent product hazard litigation . . . .” Id.
For an “explor[ation of] the causes of action that may be brought against the fast-food
industry and the individual potential for success of each,” see Romero, supra note 28, at 243.
For one failed effort, see Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims against McDonald’s, including claims of deceptive sales
practices, sale of addictive products, and negligence). See generally Norah Leary Jones, Note,
The Illinois Commonsense Consumption Act: End of the Road for Fast Food Litigation in
Illinois?, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 983, 1021 (2005) (discussing generally the legislative response to
obesity litigation, as well as the Illinois Commonsense Consumption Act, in particular).
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114
with childhood obesity are well documented, that obesity is
115
reasonably straightforward to assess, and that obesity has been
framed as a distinct public health problem,116 we choose to focus on
that particular affliction. Moreover, it seems morally more compelling
to hold food companies responsible for reducing childhood obesity
than, say, for improving children’s well-being more generally. As a
consequence, however, one needs to be attentive to the risk that, in
acting to meet the regulatory goal, the regulated firms might engage
in socially perverse actions that bring about harms of other sorts,
thereby offsetting the intended benefit to children.

2. Determining the Scope of the Regulation—Why Children, Not
Adults? Our regulation targets the rate of obesity in children, rather
than in the general population. There are a number of justifications
for this choice. First, children are a relatively powerless group. Much
of their diet is outside their control, dictated by the offerings of school
cafeterias, the contents of vending machines, and the constraints of
parents’ hectic schedules and limited budgets.117 Children are also
highly suggestible, and thus particularly vulnerable to the food
118
industry’s aggressive marketing strategies. At the same time, these

114. See, e.g., NESTLE, supra note 92, at 175 (“Because [childhood] obesity tends to persist
into adulthood, this condition may well predispose overweight and obese children to
cardiovascular and other chronic disease risks later in life.”); Salinsky, supra note 1, at 4 (“The
consequences of childhood obesity are severe, influencing children’s mental, physical, and social
well-being and resulting in significant health care expenditures.”).
115. Body mass index is the standard measurement used to determine obesity. It is
imperfect as applied to adults, though, because it does not take age or muscle mass into account.
See supra note 1.
116. See supra note 2.
117. See NESTLE, supra note 92, at 176 (“American children eat one out of every three
meals outside the home, where foods are demonstrably higher in calories, fat, saturated fat, and
salt as well as lower in more desirable nutrients.”).
118. Justice Thomas noted this fact:
Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades has had many causes, a
significant factor has been the increased availability of large quantities of high-calorie,
high-fat foods. . . . Such foods, of course, have been aggressively marketed and
promoted by fast food companies. . . . Moreover, there is considerable evidence that
they have been successful in changing children’s eating behavior.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587–88 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
NESTLE, supra note 92, at 202 (“Moving up in age targets, PepsiCo states explicitly that its
strategy is to expand soft drink consumption among children aged 6 to 11.”); Mello et al., supra
note 18, at 2607 (“[Antiobesity] initiatives are most likely to gain acceptance if they focus on
children and adolescents. Young people are especially vulnerable to advertising, and there is
greater political tolerance for legal interventions on their behalf—this is a clear lesson from the
history of tobacco control.”); Salinsky, supra note 1, at 9 (“Regulatory bodies and the courts
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qualities make children prime candidates for reconditioning.
Moreover, it is much easier for the food industry to blame adults for
their own obesity than it is to blame children (even though so many
obese adults were obese or overweight as children). In any case,
reducing childhood obesity may very likely lead to longer-term
reductions in obesity rates in adults. Finally, it is critical to appreciate
that, over the course of a regulatory period, individuals will pass
through the childhood stage. Therefore, measured rates of childhood
obesity could well drop, not so much from getting already obese
children to become thinner, but from prevention measures that
sharply reduce the rate at which “incoming” children become obese.119
And given the not-altogether-happy experience with the “diet”
industry, prevention may well be the most promising avenue to
take.120
3. Setting the Level of the Target—Why a 50 Percent Reduction?
The percentage of American children who are obese has tripled in the
last thirty years, with the rate of obesity currently around 16
percent.121 We have decided that the goal of the regulation should be
to bring the obesity rate closer to its 1970s level. More specifically, we
seek to achieve a national childhood obesity rate of 8 percent or less
by the end of the first regulatory cycle (and a lower rate in any
subsequent cycle).122 As we will explain in more detail,123 this means
reducing the number of obese schoolchildren by approximately 50
percent, from about 10 million to 5 million.
There are several reasons to demand this level rather than some
lower level, or the elimination of childhood obesity altogether. First,
as a general matter the level demanded by the PBR scheme must be

have recognized the special status and cognitive limitations of children in determining the
lawfulness of child-oriented advertising practices and the regulation of such practices. . . .
Although children begin to differentiate ads from entertainment content as early as three years
of age, children generally do not develop the ability to attribute persuasive intent to advertising
until the age of seven or eight.”) (citations omitted).
119. See infra Part VI.C.
120. See John Catford & Ian Caterson, Snowballing Obesity: Australians Will Get Run Over
if They Just Sit There, 179 MED. J. AUSTL. 577, 578–79 (2003) (contrasting the growth of the diet
industry with the rapid increase in obesity and noting the limited access to diet programs for
disadvantaged groups).
121. Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1649.
122. The rest of the Article assumes that we have chosen a target obesity rate of 8 percent.
If that were altered, then other figures we present would also change.
123. See supra Part IV.D.
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substantial but not overly ambitious. Second, there are genetic factors
that cause some individuals to be obese even in the absence of a
lifestyle of overconsumption and underexertion; this goes to the issue
124
of capacity that we discussed within the context of NCLB. Third,
the ubiquity of things like fast-food chains, junk food advertising, and
enormous portion size125 is a relatively recent phenomenon.126
Therefore, the burden our regulation places on the food industry is
rationally related to the direct effects that the industry has had on
American youth over the last thirty years. Finally, we are talking
about a first-round target only. Shortly, we will offer some
theoretically based analysis for selecting the performance target.127
But first we turn to how firms are selected as targets of the
regulation, and then we discuss how individual children are made the
responsibility of individual firms.
B. Who Is Regulated?—Larger Firms Selling Bad Food That Is
Consumed by (or Marketed to) Children
1. Why Only Food Sellers? First, note that we limit our PBR
128
scheme to a subset of the food industry. We concede that there are
arguments in favor of including different industries in the regulation.
For instance, television and video games may enable the sedentary
lifestyle many children lead.129 This suggests that PBR could hold

124. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
125. See French, supra note 24, at 841S (noting that “[i]t is well documented that portion
sizes for foods purchased at fast food places and restaurants have increased sharply over the
past two decades” and contrasting old and modern “single-serving” sizes of Coca-Cola bottles,
candy bars, potato chips, bagels, and muffins).
126. See NESTLE, supra note 92, at 21 (“In recent years, [food companies] have embraced a
new strategy: increasing the sizes of food portions. Advertising, new products, and larger
portions all contribute to a food environment that promotes eating more, not less.”); Shin-Yi
Chou et al., An Economic Analysis of Adult Obesity: Results from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 565, 580–81 (2004) (finding that the increase in the
number of restaurants per capita has contributed to rising obesity).
127. See infra Part IV.H.
128. Throughout this Article, “food industry” refers to the food and beverage industry.
129. Professor Nestle notes that, although children are watching less television today, this
drop in viewing time is more than made up for with internet surfing and computer games.
NESTLE, supra note 92, at 180–81; see also Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson,
Technological Change and the Growth of Obesity: A Theoretical and Empirical Examination 34
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8946, 2002), available at
http://milkeninstitute.org/pdf/obesity.pdf (“Leisure issues are particularly important for
understanding the growth in child obesity that may be due to technological change, such as
computers and television . . . .”).
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television networks and video game manufacturers partly responsible
130
for reducing childhood obesity. Nonetheless, we believe that the
regulatory scheme will be more manageable and cohesive if limited to
the food industry, at least for the first cycle of regulation.
2. Defining “Bad” Food. Second, our proposal does not apply
to providers of all food products. Rather, within the food industry, it
determines the set of foods whose providers are subject to regulation
by a two-part test comprised of a nutrition prong and a marketing
prong, both of which must be satisfied.
a. The Nutrition Prong. The nutrition prong is applied first and
its initial goal is to separate obesity-promoting foods from other
foods, with only providers of the former being subject to PBR. We
propose that a retail food product satisfies the nutrition prong if more
than 30 percent of its calories come from fat or more than 40 percent
of its calories come from sugar.
The standards enunciated in the Department of Health and
Human Services and Department of Agriculture’s Dietary Guidelines
for Americans 2005 form the basis for the fat and sugar threshold
131
levels making up the nutritional prong. Other public health
advocates have specified nutritional standards that differ slightly but
fall in the same general range. For example, the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI) defines “foods of poor nutritional quality”
as those meeting one or more criteria of badness, such as having more
than 35 percent of calories from fat, more than 35 percent added
sugar by weight, more than 10 percent calories from saturated and
trans fat, or more than certain sodium thresholds.132 Foods, however,
meeting one of more of these criteria may be redeemed if they
133
contain enough fruit, whole grains, or vitamins. CSPI’s definition
for “beverages of poor nutritional quality” is essentially a list of
beverage types, such as soft drinks, sports drinks, sweetened iced teas,

130. See generally NESTLE, supra note 92, at 8 (“[T]he number of hours spent watching
television is one of the best predictors of [becoming] overweight . . . .”).
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY
GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS viii (2005), available at http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/
dga2005/document/pdf/DGA2005.pdf (“Keep total fat intake . . . between 25 to 35 percent of
calories for children and adolescents 4 to 18 years of age . . . .”).
132. Center for Science in the Public Interest, Defining Foods of Poor Nutritional Quality,
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/foods_of_poor_nutritional.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
133. Id.
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fruit-based drinks that contain added sweeteners and less than 50
134
percent real fruit juice, caffeinated drinks, and high-fat milk.
The thresholds we propose (30 percent for fat, 40 percent for
sugar) are very much in the same ballpark as CSPI’s, but have several
advantages for our purposes. First, our formula is simpler. It does not
account for sodium and other nutrients because our analysis targets
the key nutritional components that promote obesity. Second, our
formula works for food and beverages at the same time, because it is
135
based on percent of calories from sugar rather than added weight.
Third, because we want to assess responsibility based on how bad a
product is, we need a measure of relative badness among the covered
products and not simply a measure that provides a binary test like
CSPI’s list of included and excluded beverages.
No matter what nutritional standard one chooses, such standards
tend to evolve and become finely tuned as we hone our
understanding of the body’s relationship with food. Periodically, old
nutritional standards may even get turned on their head. In any
regulatory scheme, however, regulators must make decisions using
136
the best information available. If the thresholds of the nutritional
prong become outdated due to scientific advances, regulators can
update the thresholds for a subsequent regulatory cycle.
b. The Marketing Prong. The marketing prong comes next. A
firm whose brand name appears on a product satisfying the nutrition
prong gets included in the regulatory structure if, in addition, the
product either enjoys significant consumption by children or is
significantly marketed to children. Thus, our regime completely
excludes unhealthy products not marketed to children or much
consumed by children.
The concept of “marketing to children” includes marketing that
is intended to reach parents to encourage child consumption or family

134. Id.
135. To understand the distinction, notice that, although sugar provides nearly all the
calories of soda, it makes up less than 10 percent of the weight, with water making up the rest.
Therefore, under CSPI’s “added weight” threshold for sugar content (which they wisely apply
only to foods rather than beverages), soda would not qualify as being of poor nutritional quality.
136. See Koplan, supra note 6, at xii (“As the [IOM report, Preventing Childhood Obesity:
Health in the Balance,] acknowledged, we must draw from the best available evidence rather
than waiting for the best possible evidence to mount an effective and sustained response.”).
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137
138
consumption. Examples include Jif’s “Choosy moms choose Jif”
139
and KFC’s “Bring back dinner,” respectively. Other major avenues
for satisfying the marketing prong include advertisements on youthoriented television shows, commercials that show children consuming
the product, product placement in movies aimed at youths, inclusion
in school vending machines, and mall food-court vendors.140
Firms might argue that it is unfair to include their product simply
because they significantly market to children if, in fact, there
currently is no proof that children significantly consume their
products. We feel that it is fair, however, to use the marketing
measurement for several reasons. First, most of the time it will be a
very good proxy for child consumption and firms that significantly
market toward children indeed enjoy significant consumption by
children. Although this might not always be the case, the cost of
gathering perfect information outweighs the benefits of eliminating
imperfections.141 The key point is that, under the second prong, a
regulator can include a product in the regulatory scheme without
having to specifically measure its actual consumption by children.
Beyond that, we justify using the alternative test under the
marketing prong on the ground that firms that significantly promote
their products to children are doing what they can to ensure that
children significantly consume the product, if not now, then in the
very near future. The industry would not spend billions of dollars on
advertising if this were not so. Thus, it is morally and logically sound

137. See NESTLE, supra note 92, at 176 (“Marketers have long known that children make
attractive customers, but attention to this group (and to younger and younger members within
it) has increased sharply in recent years.”); Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1700 (“The average
child sees 10,000 television food advertisements each year, with 95% for fast food, soft drinks,
candy, and sugared cereal.”); Salinsky, supra note 1, at 7 (“One study found that children
observed in a grocery store with their parents successfully instigated purchases 45 percent of the
time.”).
138. JIF, http://www.jif.com/home.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
139. Kentucky Fried Chicken, http://www.bringbackdinner.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
140. For an analysis of the “doubtful future for an absolute ban on [fast-food]
advertisements targeting children,” see Munger, supra note 23, at 458. Munger notes that
“although the similarities of the advertising methods are uncanny, public sentiments regarding
fast food advertising targeting children has not reached the same level of intensity and vigilance
as that directed toward tobacco advertising.” Id. at 477. Furthermore, “no one has shown that
foods have physically addictive properties, much less that food companies manipulate their
addictive content to encourage dependence.” Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2602.
141. Information about advertising is likely to be more reliable and cheaper to collect than
information about who is consuming how much of a given product.
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to allow both current consumption by children and marketing to
children to trigger a product’s inclusion.
3. Exempt Food Sellers. Our scheme contains a small-business
exemption. (In deciding whether one qualifies as a small business, all
of the outlets of national chains would be counted together,
regardless of whether they are owned operations or franchises.) The
pragmatic justifications for the small business exemption are that
these firms are less able to afford participation in the scheme and that
administering the regulation’s application to small firms would be
difficult and costly. A perhaps more principled justification is that
small businesses are less likely to have engaged in large-scale,
aggressive marketing toward children in the first place.
Schools are also exempt. First of all, there are already other
regulations governing schools, school vending machines, and the
142
nutritional content of school lunches. Second, this exemption might
also be viewed as a special case of the small-business exemption. And
third, schools will have a special role to play in our proposal in any
case, as Section D discusses.
C. Allocating Responsibility for “Bad” Food
1. Allocating Products to Firms. The focus of our proposal is to
assign responsibility to the party whose brand name appears on an
unhealthy product, and if there is no brand name, then to the retailer
of the product. Those parties generally have the most control over
both the composition of the food and the nature of its marketing.
Here is how this two-prong “bad” food test would apply to some
familiar situations in the retail store. For a supermarket (like
Safeway), a hypermarket (like Costco) or a minimarket (like 7Eleven), the two-prong “bad” food test would work in the following
way. For covered retail products on the shelf, like a bag of Frito-Lay
potato chips, Frito-Lay (actually its parent owner, PepsiCo) would
have to take responsibility. For a covered house-branded product like
Safeway Select Cola, Safeway would have to take responsibility. And
if Costco, for example, sells chocolate chip cookies with no brand
attached, Costco would have to take responsibility for them.
Moreover, if retailers sell covered products made by branded exempt

142. INST. OF MED., PROGRESS IN PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HOW DO WE
MEASURE UP? 239–44 (2006).
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small businesses, then those products would be treated like
unbranded and house-branded products—they would be the
responsibility of the retailer.
Turning to restaurants, McDonald’s, for example, would take
responsibility for the food it sells, like burgers and fries. Yet,
responsibility for the branded beverages it sells would attach to the
manufacturer of that beverage, e.g., Coca-Cola, at least when the plan
also covers the branded provider. After all, sweetened beverages are
generally requested by customers, and marketed by restaurants, by
their brand name. Moreover, whereas McDonald’s controls the
composition of the fries and burgers, Coke controls the content of the
beverages.
Although we do not have precise data, we envision that, although
the small business exemption will exclude a large number of firms,
together they will only account for a small share of the market in
“bad” food. As a rough rule of thumb, small businesses may comprise
80 percent of food makers/sellers but only 20 percent of the industry’s
sales. Moreover, because large retailers would assume the
responsibility for some of the products of these sellers, our proposal
would exclude even less than 20 percent of all “bad” food if the
preceding estimate is correct.
2. Allocating Shares of the Regulatory Burden to Covered Firms.
So far, we have covered the relatively easy part, even though we
admit that the eventual precise details of our plan might have to be
somewhat different from those we have set out so far. The harder
problem is deciding how to allocate, measure, and enforce obesityreduction targets of those nonexempt firms whose products our
regime has defined as unhealthy and are substantially consumed by
(or marketed to) children.
a. Share of Bad Calories. We have concluded that a firm’s
revenue from products that satisfy the two-prong test should not form
the basis of its share of the burden, for revenue is not intrinsically tied
to the obesity problem. Instead, under our proposal each included
firm will get a share of the responsibility that reflects both the firm’s
caloric market share and the “badness” of the product. First, for a
given food or beverage product, we compute the excess fat and excess
sugar and combine these two figures into a total “excess badness”
multiplier. The product’s “calories sold” is the units sold times the
calories per unit. We then multiply the calories sold by the excess
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badness multiplier. We repeat this for all the products of a given firm,
the sum of which gives the total caloric badness produced by that
firm. This is the numerator in the fraction we seek, because we want
to find that firm’s share of the total caloric badness produced by all
firms. Repeating this process for each firm and summing the results
gives the denominator in the desired fraction.
Here is the mathematical derivation of the formula we propose
for sharing responsibility among nonexempt firms. Suppose that a
firm Xi sells a product y.
Let pf (y) be the fraction of y’s calories that comes from fat.
Let pf’(y) = pf (y) – fat threshold = pf (y) – 0.3.
This is the excess badness from fat of y.
Let ps (y) be the fraction of y’s calories that comes from sugar.
Let ps’(y) = ps (y) – sugar threshold = ps (y) – 0.4.
This is the excess badness from sugar of y.
Let p’(y) = max{0, pf’ (y)} + max{0, ps’ (y)}.
This is the badness factor of y.
Let Q(y) be the total calories of all the product y that firm Xi
sells.
For example, if each y has 200 calories, and firm Xi sells a total of
3 units of y, then Q(y) = 600.
Firm Xi acquires obesity responsibility for selling y, and we keep
track of the amount of responsibility as Q(y) multiplied by p’(y).
Literally, the badness of the product and the amount sold are factors.
We find firm Xi’s total raw score by summing over all included
products of Xi.
Then, we get Xi’s share of the obesity problem by dividing its raw
score by the sum of the raw scores of all other included firms. Thus,
the formula for a firm’s share S of the obesity problem is given below.

Although implementing this formula requires a significant
amount of data, firms likely keep track of such data already. In that
case, the regulatory body could fairly easily gather the reliable
information needed to operate this part of the scheme.
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3. Alternatives. One drawback of this formula, however, is that
it does not distinguish between moderate and heavy consumption of
the product by children. It is true that for any firm to be included in
the scheme, its product must be significantly marketed to, or
significantly consumed by, children. Once a firm’s product passes this
test, however, our formula does not capture the precise share of the
total units sold that are consumed by children versus adults.
We could alter the formula to account for this, but doing so
would have to sacrifice one very appealing aspect of the current
design. At this point, the formula requires gathering information only
on nutritional content and total sales. These are reasonably hard
numbers that require no estimates, surveys, or projections.
Determining how much of a product is ending up in whose hands
introduces an element of unreliability and, with it, an opportunity for
143
manipulation and shortchanging of responsibility. To be sure, if this
additional refinement in the formula were desired, a special body
could be put in charge of gathering data to help determine how much
of each covered product is actually consumed by children. That, of
course, involves additional expense. Note also that this alternative
approach would render meaningless the inclusion of products in the
regime merely because they are significantly marketed to children.
We put this possible further elaboration aside for now, noting
only that this whole matter is only a real problem to the extent that
some covered products are significantly consumed either a lot less or
a lot more by children than adults as compared with the typical
covered product.
To roughly illustrate how our proposal would work, we provide
some examples here, the data for which strike us as approximately
correct. Table 1 below shows the extent to which these key “bad”
food items exceed the proposed thresholds of 30 percent fat and 40
percent sugar and also shows the average American annual caloric
intake of each of these products. In addition, the table gives a
“badness index” for these foods, assuming that these are the only

143. For example, in the Philip Morris case, the government defined youth smoking in terms
of daily smoking. Plaintiff’s Proposed Final Judgment and Order at 11, United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 99-2496). The intervenors’ brief objects
to this, stating that youth smoking should be based on a thirty-day measure. Post-Trial Brief of
Plaintiff-Intervenors at 72–75, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2006) (No. 99-2496). Naturally, how one frames the survey questions affects the results.
This also shows that even the “good guys” often end up inadvertently making subjective choices
that advantage the “bad guys.”
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foods covered by the scheme (a considerable simplification). The
badness index should be thought of as the percent of responsibility
for the obesity problem that each food category shoulders.
Table 1. Percent Responsibility for Obesity, by Food Category
Column A = Percent of calories from fat (F) or sugar (S).
Column B = Percent of calories that exceed the nutritional
thresholds of 30 percent fat or 40 percent sugar.
Column C = Annual per capita caloric intake for each food
category.
Column D = Annual per capita excess calories consumed
(Column B multiplied by Column C).
Column E = Badness index, or percent of responsibility for
obesity problem (Column D entry divided by Total for Column D).
A

B

C

D

E

Candy (nonchocolate)

60(S)

20

23,369

4,674

5

Chips

62(F)

32

39,680

12,698

14

Ice Cream

56(F)

26

19,200

4,992

5

36(S)

0

Chocolate

55(F)

25

31,416

7,854

9

31(S)

0

Pizza

37(F)

7

29,007

2,030

2

Hamburger

47(F)

17

76,800

13,056

14

Fried Chicken

46(F)

16

4,004

641

1

Cheese

74(F)

44

18,240

8,026

9

Soft Drinks

97(S)

57

57,540

32,798

36

French Fries

48(F)

18

23,177

Total

4,172

5

90,941

100%

Table 1 shows that more than one-third of the calories beyond
the “bad” food threshold comes from sweetened soft drinks—both
because so many are consumed and because they are so high in sugar.
Table 2, below, illustrates some market shares of well-known
firms and the corresponding share of the obesity problem that our
proposal would assign to them, again assuming for these purposes
that the only covered products would be the ten illustrated here.
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Table 2. Market Share and Obesity Reduction Share for Select Firms
Firm

Market Share

Obesity Reduction Share

Coca-Cola

43% soft drinks

15.5

Dreyer’s

23% ice cream

1.3

18% burgers

2.6

Burger King

These percentages are larger than those our program would
actually assign because many other “bad” products would also be
reached by the regulation. Yet, the table gives some sense of the
144
relative responsibilities that would go to well-known national firms,
and makes clear how important is the role of soft drinks in the overall
picture.
D. Getting Credit for What?
Suppose that the formula just described determines that a
particular firm, Acme, is responsible for 5 percent of America’s
childhood obesity problem. What does our proposal do now? We
think it would be unworkable to suggest, for example, that Acme be
held responsible for making each obese child in America 5 percent
less obese, with other firms joining in according to their respective
shares. Even if partially successful results occurred, the regulator
would have no way to know whether Acme had done its duty, while
other firms neglected theirs, or vice versa.
Instead, we propose that Acme be responsible for 5 percent of
the total number of fewer children. More precisely, our program’s
goal is for the nation to wind up with (approximately) 5 million
instead of 10 million obese schoolchildren. And so, if Acme were
responsible for 5 percent of the goal, it would be responsible for
250,000 of that 5 million total reduction.
Under this approach, achieving the PBR goal would be a yes-orno matter at the individual child level. Assuming a child’s body mass
index would determine whether that child is obese or not, then at the

144. “For example, if a company has an 80% market share of the product in question, this
does not necessarily mean that it bears 80% of the responsibility for injury to a specific
individual, but it is much more likely that it is 80% responsible for injury to the population as a
whole.” Alderman & Daynard, supra note 10, at 86 (suggesting a market share approach in the
event that states decide to bring suit against the food industry to recoup Medicaid expenses
incurred on account of obesity).
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time of measurement each year every child in Acme’s pool would be
counted as either below the obesity threshold or not. And of all of
those children in Acme’s pool, eventually there would have to be
250,000 fewer obese children for Acme to achieve compliance.
We realize that this is not the only way to measure and regulate
reduced obesity, although it is perhaps the easiest. For example,
although it would complicate things, we could modify our scheme to
reward significant improvement short of achieving nonobese status.
Suppose Acme is assigned responsibility for an obese child who needs
to shed X pounds to qualify as nonobese. One possible solution would
be that, if Acme helps the child lose at least half those pounds, then
Acme might be given a one-half unit of credit. In this respect,
although Acme would be 100 percent responsible for the status of the
child, it would not necessarily have to cure the child 100 percent in
order to receive some credit.
One might consider this solution a reasonable compromise
between competing interests. On the one hand, it is probably quite
difficult to get an already extremely obese child down to the
nonobesity threshold. Yet firms should not completely neglect these
children on the assumption that such efforts would be wasted were
the child to make significant improvement but fall short of being
cured. (Note the parallel problem with NCLB and the incentive of
schools to give up on children who are “hopelessly far behind.”) On
the other hand, firms should not receive full credit for getting only
halfway to the plan’s objective, because the regulation should
preserve a firm’s incentive to help children achieve their weight-loss
goals.
Yet another (perhaps even more complicated) solution would be
to move entirely to an excess-weight measure as the performancebased target. Instead of giving Acme responsibility for 5 percent of
the obese children, the regulation could give Acme responsibility for
the excess weight of 5 percent of the obese children covered by the
plan. Under this approach, Acme could get some credit toward
meeting its obligation for every pound of lowered excess weight of
the children in its pool.
But, for now, for reasons of both ease and consistency of
description, we will assume the plan goes ahead on the binary basis of
giving Acme credit only when there are fewer children in its pool who
are obese.
The discussion so far goes to the question of deciding when a
firm will be credited with success for the children assigned to it. But
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how should one decide which children are Acme’s obligation? Here is
where we bring back the schools.
E. Assigning Children to Firms
1. Using Schools as the Pooling Mechanism. Children largely
divide their time between home (a private area) and school (a public
area). We have concluded that there is considerable appeal in
organizing the duties of regulated firms around schools. If nothing
else, we think that it is fairly easy to measure obesity rates in schools.
Moreover, given that the primary functions of schooling are
education and socialization, the school setting is potentially a good
place to reeducate and resocialize children to healthy eating and
drinking and to healthy living more generally. Firms covered by the
plan might think it best to reach out at the community level rather
than focus on schools, but even broader community cohesion is often
anchored in a community’s schools.
Therefore, broadly speaking, our proposal first assigns schools to
firms. That is, multiple schools will typically be matched to a given
firm, but multiple firms are not matched to a given school. That way,
accountability for progress with respect to a given school’s population
can be reliably established. Thus, a firm like Acme will have to reduce
the overall obesity rate for children attending the group of schools
assigned to it.
Notice, however, that under our proposal Acme’s target is not
school specific. It gets credit for lower obesity wherever it achieves it.
So it does not matter for purposes of our program whether its schools
all wind up with the same obesity rate, or even if they all wind up with
a rate at or below some target. For Acme, its goal is to contribute
250,000 fewer obese children (from the schools assigned to it) to the
national target of 5 million.
2. Eligible Schools. But we do not include all schools in our
proposal. Instead, for a school to be eligible to be matched to a firm
under the regulation, we have concluded that it should currently have
an obesity rate among its children of 8 percent or more. One reason
for this limitation is that these are the schools whose children, as a
group, are doing worse than the target national average. In this way,
the firms in the program will have to focus their resources on schools
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that exhibit a substantial problem, possibly reflective of a larger
145
community problem. Second, by focusing on these schools, firms
may be able to take advantage of economies of scale, because every
measure they implement will reach proportionately more afflicted
children. There is another consequence of limiting the program to the
subset of schools with higher obesity rates. A firm can achieve
compliance only by bringing down the obesity rates in participating
schools further than would be required if it could get credit for
obesity reduction in schools that already have relatively low rates.
Finally, creating a threshold obesity-rate requirement for covered
schools helps avoid a potentially unattractive feature of how firms’
achievements might be attained. This has to do with the social-class
aspects of the obesity problem.
Suppose that Madison Elementary School, with an obesity rate
of 5 percent or less, were assigned to Acme, and suppose that
Madison is predominantly populated with the children of white,
upper-middle-class families. This is consistent with the available
social science data, which shows that the obesity problem is especially
146
147
critical for low-income children and children of color. So, as with
145. Professor Petty and others draw the connection between food consumption habits and
income:
Studies show that low-income consumers of all races have less information about
healthy products than middle- and high-income consumers. People of color who are
also low-income consumers may be less likely to purchase such products and to
receive the benefits from using them. In a recent study of advertising on prime time
television, researchers found that a disproportionate number of ads for unhealthy
foods were aired on television programs favored by Black Americans.
....
. . . Although there are many reasons for these differences [in the obesity rates of
racial groups], experts suggest that some factors include poor nutrition, a lower
percentage of grocery stores in urban areas as compared to suburban areas, a lack of
readily available healthier foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables, and insufficient
information about the nutritional benefits of such foods.
Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8
MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 356–58 (2003).
146. NESTLE, supra note 92, at 27 (“In the United States, low-income groups seem to have
about the same nutrient intake as people who are better off, but they choose diets higher in
calories, fat, meat, and sugar, and they display higher rates of obesity and chronic diseases.”);
see also Joanne F. Guthrie et al., Understanding Economic and Behavioral Influences on Fruit
and Vegetable Choices, 3 AMBER WAVES 36, 38 (2005), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
AmberWaves/April05/pdf/april05_feature_fruitsandvegetables.pdf (noting that higher levels of
income and education in households induce greater weekly spending on produce).
147. “Obesity rates are rising rapidly among children and adolescents, especially those who
are African-American or Hispanic. In the early 1990s, for example, 23% of white girls aged 6-11
were overweight, compared to 29% of Mexican-American girls and 31% of black girls.”
NESTLE, supra note 92, at 175. Moreover, “[b]oth [Coca-Cola and PepsiCo], for example,
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the concern that PBR in the pollution field might create “toxic hot
spots” in low-income and minority communities and with the
requirement in NCLB that schools make educational progress with
respect to all racial/ethnic groups, we want to avoid at the outset the
risk that primarily upper-income areas will benefit from PBR in the
field of childhood obesity. Put differently, by excluding schools like
Madison from the plan, we ensure that participating firm resources
will be disproportionately made available to children in low-income
and minority communities.
Moreover, including all schools in the program might allow some
participating firms to meet their targets too easily—a problem that
some say exists with using PBR in the RECLAIM program in the
pollution field. Returning to the Madison Elementary School
example, because there is unlikely to be a pervasive, community-wide
problem with adult obesity around the school, Acme will probably
have to battle few counterproductive forces in its attempt to reduce
the obesity rate of children at Madison. Furthermore, the school’s
families are likely to include fewer single parents, and among the twoparent households, many are likely to have one parent who does not
work outside the home.148 It is possible, then, that Acme might simply
institute a rather uncreative and inexpensive “awareness-raising”
campaign, knowing that the families of the relatively few obese (or
potentially obese) children are already in a position to exert
substantial effort and attention to changing their own child’s
situation.
To be sure, a school with already low obesity rates might face the
problem that most of its children who are obese are actually the
hardest to change. This could happen because most families in those
schools have already taken the obvious and easier measures to
prevent obesity in their own children. In that case, Acme would find
out that cheap schemes aimed at children in those schools do not
work, and it might actually choose to focus its attention on the
schools with higher rates. But, we are reluctant to leave that to
chance.
aggressively target African-American and Hispanic consumers with ‘guerilla-marketing tactics’
to distribute products in urban neighborhoods.” Id. at 201. See also Patricia M. Anderson et al.,
Maternal Employment and Overweight Children, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 477, 485, 487 (2003), for a
discussion of studies that have shown African-American children are more likely to be
overweight and that Hispanic and African-American children are heavier on average.
148. But cf. Anderson et al., supra note 147, at 485 (finding that mothers working higher
numbers of hours negatively affects the weight of children in households of higher income).
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Suppose Acme focuses on Madison by promoting a hands-on
approach on the part of parents, and suppose this were effective for
the Madison community. Yet, for reasons already noted, many lowerincome parents are likely not in a position to devote their time and
energies to such schemes. This means that strategies that work for
Madison may well fail in the schools where poorer families
predominate, so that those schools would not benefit from merely
copying Madison-based strategies. Worse, an approach like that
imagined for Madison threatens to undermine a central goal of PBR,
which is to reconceptualize the obesity crisis as principally a food
industry problem rather than a parenting problem. In sum, dealing
only with schools with obesity rates of 8 percent or more, firms are
more likely to have to contend with children whose weight issues
cannot be easily solved with cheap measures largely carried out by
parents. This strategy also reinforces our central goal of reframing
childhood obesity as problem to be solved by the food industry rather
than by parents.
We recognize that a potentially unintended side effect of
focusing the regulation entirely on reducing obesity rates in schools
with high rates could be an increase in the obesity rate in schools like
Madison that the regulation does not cover. Were that to happen, it
would undercut any success firms achieved in covered schools. Yet,
we are skeptical that obesity rates would rise in the schools outside
the plan as a consequence of firm interventions in participating
schools. Indeed, we believe that, if anything, the rates in
nonparticipating schools more likely would also go down. For
example, those schools might voluntarily adopt programs that they
see as working to reduce obesity rates in participating schools.
Notice now that the way we have structured our program means
that participating firms do not need to reduce obesity rates in all of
the participating schools to 8 percent to achieve full compliance. First,
as already noted, because a firm’s number of fewer obese children can
come from any of its assigned schools, overall national compliance
could be achieved in the absence of success in certain individual
schools. Second, the number of obese children in participating schools
is sufficiently high that it will likely be necessary only to reduce the
average obesity rate across all participating schools to approximately
10 percent (as a rough estimate). Put differently, because the overall
national goal of 8 percent includes children in nonparticipating
schools whose rates are already under 8 percent (and, we assume, will
remain so), the average rate in participating schools can be higher.
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A numerical example further illustrates the point. Suppose that
of approximately 60 million school children nationwide, 40 million
attend participating schools, and of these children, say, 9 million are
obese; assume further that 20 million children attend nonparticipating
schools in which, say, 1 million are obese. This puts the obesity rate at
5 percent in the nonparticipating schools, over 20 percent in the
participating schools, and just over 16 percent overall (the actual
national average). For the participating schools, then, the goal would
be to reduce the 9 million number by 5 million, leaving them with 4
million obese children, which would yield an overall average obesity
rate of 10 percent in those schools (i.e., 4 million out of 40 million). A
reduction from 9 to 4 million for the schools in the program would
mean that the program has made terrific headway in turning around
the childhood obesity problem.
Note also that, based on these numbers, a firm like Acme would
be assigned schools with slightly more than 400,000 obese children,
out of whom 250,000 would be its target reduction goal. Put
differently, its schools would probably have around 2 million children
enrolled (5 percent of 40 million) of whom slightly more than 20
percent were obese at the program’s inception.
3. School Assignment Formula. The performance goal of our
plan is to reduce the national obesity rate of schoolchildren to 8
percent, and only schools whose obesity rates are above 8 percent will
be assigned to participating firms. Thus, to assign schools to firms
properly, we need to find the target average obesity rate at the
eligible schools that would reduce the national rate to 8 percent.
Knowing this target obesity rate, we can assign schools in a way that
ensures that each firm is responsible for the appropriate number of
149
schoolchildren to meet its obesity reduction goals.
Here is a mathematical presentation of the derivation of the
school-set assignment.
Let x be the proportion of students attending ineligible schools.
That is, x is the fraction consisting of the number of students from
ineligible schools divided by the total number of schoolchildren.
Then (1 – x) is the proportion of students attending eligible
schools.
149. If Acme is responsible for curing 100 obese children, we cannot assign it schools whose
total obese population is 100, because then Acme would have to reduce the obesity rate to 0
percent at its assigned schools.
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Let y be the current average obesity rate of the ineligible schools.
Let z be the target average obesity rate at the eligible schools. By
target, we mean the average rate that would cause the average
nationwide rate (combining eligible and ineligible schools) to be 8
percent.
The values of x and y are current data, and thus are
ascertainable. We want to find the value of z in terms of the “known”
quantities x and y.
By construction, the values x, y, and z satisfy the following
relationship:

Solving for z in terms of x and y, we get

Therefore, Acme must be assigned a subset T of eligible schools
such that

where N(T) is the total number of obese children at this set T of
schools, P(T) is the total population of children aggregated for all the
schools in T, and S(Acme) is Acme’s share of the obesity problem,
derived in Section C.
Note again how, under our proposal, a firm receives credit for all
reductions in the obesity rate at its assigned schools; that is, it
continues to count reduced obesity even after a participating school’s
rate has dipped to 8 percent. One reason for this is that there are no
“diminishing marginal returns” when it comes to healthy children;
each additional healthy child is a worthwhile objective. We admit that
this point is somewhat in tension with the decision to make only
certain schools eligible, but recall that our reasons for excluding
certain schools from the program had primarily to do with separate
concerns about insufficiently focusing on children from low-income
and minority families and fears that intervention strategies might
overemphasize direct parental acts that are only practical for
primarily well-to-do families. Second, once a school is in the program,
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we do not want to chill vigorous efforts on the part of firms, and if a
firm is having particular success at a certain school with a certain
strategy, the regulatory scheme should recognize and encourage such
success.
4. School Clusters. In giving Acme (and other firms) the
schools for which they are responsible, we have concluded that it
would be wise to cluster those schools geographically, rather than
scattering an individual firm’s target schools across the nation.
This approach has several benefits. First, the firm can take
advantage of the community momentum that will build up as a result
of its efforts at a group of neighboring schools. School clustering will
also be logistically convenient for firms, because they can send their
nutritional and fitness experts, and other personnel associated with
the antiobesity project, to one or a few geographical areas, rather
than many.
More importantly, the method of clustering will significantly
reduce free-rider effects. Suppose Acme wants to incorporate healthpromoting advertisements into its antiobesity campaign.150 If it is
assigned a geographically compact set of schools, it can use local
media to get out its message. By contrast, if the school-allocation
system gave Acme a geographically diffuse set of schools, then an
advertising campaign would reach many schoolchildren who are not
assigned to Acme. Not only is this economically wasteful from
Acme’s point of view, but if the advertisements have positive effects
for non-Acme students, then the non-Acme firms in charge of these
children receive credit for the progress of these children without
having contributed to the result.
There is another way that clustering can mitigate the free-rider
problem. In our proposal, we also vertically cluster schools. That is,
we assign the same firm all the elementary and middle schools that
feed into a particular high school.151 This way, the firm has more
control over a longer-term stream of children. If the firm instills good
habits in the students of an elementary school, another firm will not

150. For example, Kaiser Permanente has launched an advertising campaign promoting
health. See Press Release, Kaiser Permanente, “Thrive” Ad Campaign Changing Consumer
Perceptions of Kaiser Permanente (July 6, 2005), available at http://ckp.kp.org/newsroom/
national/archive/nat_050722_newthrive.html.
151. Obviously, this implicates geographic clustering as well, given that feeder schools are in
the same district as the school into which they feed.
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reap the rewards when those same students show up as not obese in
middle school and high school.
One might be concerned about the robustness of allocating
schools to firms instead of children to firms. After all, the population
size of a school could change, as could the character of that
population. We argue that geographic clustering ensures robustness
of the scheme. That is to say, in the general case, the scheme will
absorb such changes without significant impact. A general population
boom is unlikely to occur within the ten-year lifespan of the scheme,
but even if it did occur, all firms’ schools would experience the bloat,
and so there would be no imbalance. Recall that the allocation was
merely a slicing of the obesity-problem pie. Therefore, however big
the pie, a general population boom would preserve such a
distribution. On the other hand, significant changes to a school’s
population as a result of local forces are also unlikely to affect the
firm because such dramatic population changes occur most often
when one school in a district closes down and neighboring schools
absorb the displaced students. With geographical clustering, both the
closed-down school and the absorbing schools would be assigned to
the same firm, and so the firm experiences no change. The character
of the students in the schools assigned to a firm is also unlikely to
change dramatically within ten years. If such changes do occur,
however, they are immaterial because a firm receives no guarantees
that it will get to work with a certain type of student population.
We must acknowledge one additional point here. Without
certain sorts of cooperation among participating firms, we concede
that our scheme would provide little incentive to an individual
national firm to adopt a national campaign effort, including an effort
to make a national change in the nature of its product or the extent of
its consumption. For example, suppose Coke gets assigned schools
located in a large circle radiating out from its national headquarters in
Atlanta (perhaps all Georgia schools, just to make the point here).
National efforts by Coke to cut the amount of Coke high school
students drink, or to reduce the amount of sugar in Coke, assuming
that those changes were effective in the battle against childhood
obesity, would presumably have a national impact. Yet Coke, under
our plan, only gets credit for that portion of the impact felt in
Georgia. Hence, unless Coke can somehow coordinate with Pepsi,
Cadbury, and other similar participating firms who sell sweetened
beverages, it might well focus its attentions only where it will earn its
credits.
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F. Timeline for the Regulatory Cycle
1. The Initial Cycle. All firms potentially regulated by our plan
will be given a one-year notice period before the first regulation cycle
takes effect. For one thing, this period allows firms to take steps to
avoid inclusion in the regulation altogether. For instance, a firm could
change the composition of its product so that it no longer satisfied the
nutritional prong. Avoidance by way of the marketing prong will
probably be more difficult. If the firm previously satisfied only the
second part of the marketing prong152 by marketing significantly to
children, it need only curtail such marketing measures in order to be
excluded from the scheme. But, if the firm satisfied the first part of
the marketing prong due to significant product consumption by
children, the firm most likely could not reverse this situation in the
span of a year. In fact, probably the fastest way to discourage child
consumption is to change the nutritional composition of the product
so as to not qualify for inclusion in the scheme altogether.
A second purpose of the phase-in period is to allow the
regulators to determine which firms are covered, what each firm’s
share of the regulatory target is, and which schools are to be each
firm’s responsibility. Recall that a firm’s assigned schools will be
chosen so that, when the populations of its constituent schools are
aggregated, an appropriate number of obese children become that
firm’s responsibility. Suppose a firm like Acme is charged with
eliminating the obese status of N children (say, 250,000, to use a
previous example).
One year after the assignment of schools, Acme will be required
to have finalized its initial intervention plan and begun
implementation. In this regard, the scheme has an element of
153
management-based regulation, akin to NCLB. But no obesity
reduction would yet be required as an interim matter.
To avoid heavy penalties, Acme must have reduced the number
of obese children in those schools by at least, say, .5N (125,000
according to the numbers in the example) by the end of the fifth year.
Throughout the period until this point, however, provided that firm
has an active intervention plan on file, the regulator will presume that
the firm is putting the wheels in motion, and that results will naturally

152.
153.

See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
See supra Part I.F.1.
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take some time to materialize. At the five-year mark, however, the
regulator will begin to hold Acme tightly accountable for producing
results. Moreover, after year five, the firm’s target will be prorated for
the remaining five years of the regulation cycle and penalties will
apply in each of the following years of the cycle. Thus, the first
milestone is .5N children, the second is .6N, the third is .7N, the
fourth is .8N, the fifth is .9N, and the final milestone of the cycle is N,
occurring at the end of year ten.154
If Acme does not meet the first milestone target of .5N, it will
incur a per-child penalty that year, paying an amount (which we
155
discuss in Section H) for each child by which the target number is
missed. Moreover, Acme’s target of .6N for the next year remains in
force. Thus, if Acme has not reached its .6N goal by that next year, it
will incur a penalty for whatever its overall shortfall is as of that point
in time. In this way, if a firm fails to reach its target at any one year in
time, to avoid penalties the following year it must both catch up to its
prior target and also make sufficient further progress to meet its
higher target for the next year. This system of perpetually penalizing
any early delinquency continues for the remainder of the regulation
cycle.156
In this regard, our penalty scheme is different from that
proposed by Dr. Jonathan Gruber when he recommended that the
federal government impose a PBR scheme on cigarette makers as a
remedy in its RICO lawsuit against the tobacco industry.157 In
Gruber’s plan, at the end of the first year the firm pays a per-smoker
fee for each youth it should have by then prevented from smoking but
did not. The fee is meant to be a disgorgement of the income stream
of profits that accrue to the firm if the youth in question remains a
lifelong smoker. To avoid “double counting,”158 Gruber then removes
154. One consideration is to refund penalties incurred in years six to nine if the firm cures N
obese children by year ten, though nonlinearly. This modification might depend on what the
agency does with the penalty money during the course of the regulation. Will it go in a trust to
defray the future health costs of these uncured obese children, or will it be used
contemporaneously with the regulatory program on other obese (adults? children?) in society
who are currently incurring health care costs?
155. See infra Part IV.H.
156. In addition to these penalties, the plan could assess an extra penalty at the end of the
program for falling significantly short of the target.
157. See Jonathan Gruber, Expert Report on Forward-Looking Remedies to Combat Youth
Smoking, available at http://www.tobacco-on-trial.com/2005/03/21/gruber-expert-report-onforward-looking-remedies-to-combat-youth-smoking.
158. Id.
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these already-penalized-for smokers from the calculation the
following year, when assessing how far short (if at all) the firm has by
then fallen in its task of preventing youth smoking. At that point, the
159
firm, in effect, only pays for “new” failures. Gruber’s approach is
based on the notion that once a firm has already paid for this youth’s
lifetime of smoking, it should not have to pay again if that youth
160
continues smoking the next year. Yet, we find it troubling that his
scheme effectively allows a firm to keep teen smokers hooked once it
has paid for them.
To give a numerical example, suppose Philip Morris is supposed
to reduce the number of youth smokers of its brands from 1000 to 800
at the end of period one and to 600 by the end of period two. Now
suppose it falls short of its target at the end of period one because
there are 900 youth smokers of its brands. At that point Philip Morris
will incur a penalty for each of those 100 excess smokers. For the next
period, however, it will no longer have to meet its target of 600 youth
smokers to avoid penalties. Rather, as per its original assignment, it
will only have to reduce the number of smokers by 200 in the second
period, thereby making its effective target rate for the end of the
second period 700. One way to view this is that Philip Morris has
bought up part of its target (100 smokers) by paying a penalty at the
end of the first period. A different way to put it is that the initial
target is not really 800 at the end of the first period and 600 at the end
of the second period, but rather a 200-smoker reduction in the first
period, followed by a 200-smoker reduction in the second period (as
measured by the number of smokers at the end of the first period).
By contrast, our proposal exacts penalties year by year, giving
firms a continuing incentive to meet their original targets. This means
that the social goal of achieving, say, a 50 percent reduction in
childhood obesity remains in place throughout the life of the
program. Gruber’s solution, in effect, gives up on a parallel reduction
in youth smoking prevalence once firms pay a one-time penalty for
failing to meet an interim target. In our approach a firm’s own early
failures or interim willingness to pay penalties in exchange for
shaking off the responsibility for solving the problem does not
undermine or erode the overall target. (Of course, the difference

159.
160.

Id.
Id.
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between the two approaches needs to be taken into account in
deciding on the amount of the penalties, as we discuss in Section H.)
A second point is that our plan intends for any penalties that
firms pay to be put toward covering the societal costs associated with
obesity, rather than toward obesity prevention measures. That is, the
penalty moneys are to be used to deal with the by-product of firms’
failures. In Gruber’s plan, it appears that penalty moneys might well
go toward funding government campaigns to discourage youth
smoking. But if so, then the government will, in effect, be doing some
of the tobacco industry’s job for it. Not only is this inconsistent with
the core strategy of PBR of making firms (rather than government or
the family) responsible for achieving the social objective, but also it
means that firms that fail early in the process may wind up benefiting
later on by getting credit for achieving at least some of their target
when the social gain is actually due to public health initiatives.
2. Subsequent Cycles. After the initial cycle, additional cycles
may be necessary to deal more adequately with the problem of
childhood obesity—say, to reduce the national rate to 4 percent, or
perhaps even to maintain an 8 percent rate. Subsequent cycles should
be progressively more fine-tuned, as valuable information is amassed
about how to measure the problem, how to measure progress, how to
assign responsibility to individual firms, and more.
The transition from one cycle to the next is a matter that will
require some care. Assuming for now there is to be a second cycle, we
suggest that the regulator notify firms of their potential inclusion in
the next cycle one year before the end of the initial regulation cycle
so that they can prepare. As in the initial cycle, firms can avoid
inclusion by altering their product or sharply reducing consumption
by and marketing to children, pursuant to the nutritional and
marketing prongs of the inclusion test.
If a firm was exempt under the small business exception when
the initial regulation was enacted but subsequently grew enough to
quality for inclusion, it would nonetheless remain outside the scheme
for the first cycle. But, the now-qualifying firm would be included in
the next cycle. So, too, a firm’s reduced sales during the first cycle
might properly warrant its exclusion from the second cycle. Yet, to
combat corporate manipulation designed to evade continued
inclusion in the scheme, if a covered firm “becomes” a small firm
merely by breaking away from an included parent company during
the first cycle, then the smaller firm will remain in the regulatory
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scheme, receiving a pro rata share of the former parent company’s
burden.
3. Midcycle Modifications. Because the length of the regulation
is ten years (not counting the one-year notice period before the
regulation takes effect), there are likely to be both political and
regulatory temptations to modify the program partway through it. For
example, some might feel that the nutritional standards in the twoprong test for product inclusion no longer reflect science’s best
estimate of what the “bad” foods are. Others may contend that a
bigger (or smaller) number of firms should be within reach of the
program. Some might say that the targets or the penalties now seem
too high or too low in light of new information. Others might want
schools reassigned.
In general, it is important to ignore these sirens, no matter how
wise their song may sound. At the outset of the program, the
regulator needs to send firms a clear signal that there will be no
midcycle modifications. This action has two main purposes. First, it
allows firms to begin planning in earnest, without wondering whether
they are misallocating resources because targets and penalties will
soon shift, or the list of included products will soon change. They can
begin developing a relationship with specific schools and
communities, knowing that the goodwill they build will not crumble
away due to a reshuffling of schools and firms. Rigidity of program
parameters during a cycle also facilitates fair competition among
firms. A firm that actually feels positive about participating in the
program will not have its commitment dampened by the fear that
competing firms are putting resources toward unfairly evading their
share of the responsibility for obesity.
This brings us to the second argument against midcycle
modification. If such modifications are an option, firms may focus
their money, energy, and creativity on lobbying for a relaxing of
standards rather than finding solutions to childhood obesity. A
related consideration involves information firms gather about the cost
and difficulty of meeting the targets. If the firms sense pliability in the
regulator, they have an incentive to manipulate their data to make it
seem as though the targets, the penalties, or both, are unreasonable
and unmanageable. We want to avoid this.
Another possible midcycle modification deserves special
attention. Suppose a new technology is discovered that seems to hold
great promise for solving the problem of childhood obesity. It could
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be a new kind of artificial sweetener or fat substitute. It could be a
new way of advertising that magically motivates children to be
physically active. If such a technology is discovered, some might feel
that the regulatory scheme should be altered from a performancebased system to one in which the government either directly
implements this technology to solve the childhood obesity problem,
or requires firms to include it as part of their antiobesity efforts. In
other words, the more people think they know the answer to the
question of how to reduce childhood obesity, the more temptation
there is to move away from performance-based regulation and toward
command-and-control regulation.
This instinct is misguided for several reasons. First, the
government should not step in and implement the “solution” for the
same reason that the government should not be using the penalty
proceeds in Gruber’s performance-based proposal to prevent children
from smoking. To do so would mean that firms that bear a large share
of the responsibility for creating the problem could effectively excuse
themselves from the responsibility of solving it by free-riding on
complementary government efforts.
Moreover, the government also should not force all firms to
adopt the same technology as part of their antiobesity strategy. As
novel and insightful as the technology may seem, there is no
guarantee that it will actually be, and remain, the right answer. There
are advantages to the diversification of strategies. Suppose that the
seemingly wonderful technology has a latent and harmful flaw.
Permitting diversification will mitigate the overall damage. Besides,
firms that elect not to use this specific technology will presumably be
implementing other measures, perhaps also novel. Such
experimentation could lead to the discovery of an even more effective
strategy. At the very least, sticking to the more open-ended
performance-based system rather than incorporating command-andcontrol best preserves the potential for beneficial pooling from a wide
variety of strategies.
At the same time, one need not worry that a true gem of an
answer to the obesity problem will fall by the wayside simply because
the government does not force firms to implement it. So long as a
program is in place that forces firms to internalize the cost of the
childhood obesity problem, they have an incentive to incorporate
measures that indeed seem most effective and efficient. In this way,
one can trust that a truly great technology will indeed catch on among
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firms, while the government will not force a faddish panacea upon
firms and the public in a rush of premature enthusiasm.
Of course, this argument against mandating new technology
applies not only to midcycle modifications, but also to reenactments
of the program in subsequent cycles. The difference is that, at least
throughout the first cycle, the regulation ought to be committed to
the principles of outcome-based regulation, if the purported benefits
of such a system are to be realized or debunked. After the first cycle,
legislators are of course free to abandon the whole system in favor of
new types of governmental action, a command-and-control regime, or
no program at all. At that point, they will at least have experienced a
whole cycle of experimentation with the challenge of solving the
obesity problem through PBR. And although ten years may seem like
a long time to await results and to make changes, if the plan works it
will reduce obesity rates faster than they have increased in recent
decades.
A more serious concern could arise if the sellers of “bad” food
after the end of year five, say, were a very different set of firms than
those subject to the regulatory scheme. This, in theory, might happen
if either small exempt firms suddenly took a large share of the “bad”
food market or new entrants swept into and largely captured the
“bad” food market. Yet, we find this an unlikely scenario, at least so
long as mergers, acquisitions, spin offs, and the like of food industry
firms are subject to appropriate “responsibility tracing” rules. After
all, the main recent developers of new high-fat/high-sugar products
are the existing food companies; and besides, large retailers, who are
already in the plan, would almost surely be selling any new and
popular “bad” food products. It would take the emergence from out
of nowhere of a new Wal-Mart type of establishment to create a
serious mismatch between who is being regulated and who is actually
selling “bad” food during the length of the initial cycle; and that
seems unlikely to happen in five or six years.
G. Measuring Compliance
It is important that the regulator regularly appraise the progress
that firms are making toward their ultimate performance target. First,
a firm must present the regulator its initial plan at the end of year
one.
Subsequently, the regulator must be informed as to what
progress the firm has made at the yearly milestones between years
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five and ten. This information is necessary to assess penalties should a
firm fail to meet its target. Firms themselves, however, will probably
be keeping track of much more data than this. Indeed, firms will take
frequent measurements of the children in their charge to assess which
methods are working and which are not and to have plenty of
opportunity to change course if results are not forthcoming. Given
that firms will already be spending resources gathering the data the
regulator needs, it is advantageous to rely primarily on the data
gathered by firms. The danger that a firm will manipulate or
misreport its data, however, somewhat compromises this advantage to
the regulator. To strike a balance between the competing interests of
efficiency and integrity in the regulatory scheme, the regulator will
need to conduct audits, both randomly and for cause, of the data
supplied by firms. If irregularities in the data support a finding of
fraud or bad faith, the regulator will subject the firm to additional,
very substantial penalties.
H. The Economics of Penalty and Target Choices
So far we have assumed that a national childhood obesity rate of
8 percent—a 50 percent reduction in the current rate—is a reasonable
target for ten years after the date the scheme goes into effect. And we
have assumed that the regulator can threaten firms with sensible
penalties at the ends of years five through ten that should give them
appropriate incentives to bring the childhood obesity rate down
according to schedule. Here we wish to explore, more theoretically,
both what is an appropriate target for the PBR scheme and what are
appropriate penalties.
1. The Ideal Level of Performance. First, we assume the
marginal social cost of childhood obesity to be a constant function,
although this does not affect the remainder of our analysis.161 This
social cost includes the cost of health care,162 lower future wages,163

161. If the marginal social cost function is not constant, the (necessarily constant) average
social cost can be used as the relevant measure.
162. See, e.g., NESTLE, supra note 92, at 7 (“The diet-related medical costs for just six health
conditions—coronary heart disease, cancer, stroke, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity—
exceeded $70 billion in 1995. Some authorities believe that just a 1% reduction in intake of
saturated fat across the population would prevent more than 30,000 cases of coronary heart
disease annually and save more than a billion dollars in health care costs.”).
163. See John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 456–68
(2004), summarized in THOMAS PHILIPSON ET AL., ECON. RES. SERV., USDA, THE ECONOMICS
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164
etc. In theory, it should also include the real costs that defy
measurement, such as the emotional and social toll exacted by
childhood obesity. Second, we assume that the marginal cost per child
of obesity prevention is generally upward sloping, like a supply curve.
Indeed, because some children will be more difficult to cure (or to
prevent from becoming obese), firms will have to implement more
expensive and creative methods to reach more of them. Thus, the
social cost function and the prevention cost function are likely to look
like Figure 1 below.165
The x-coordinate of the point at which the social cost and
prevention cost functions intersect gives the ideal level of
performance. For children below this level, the prevention cost curve
lies below the social cost curve, meaning that money can be saved by
preventing rather than bearing the social cost. Conversely, for each
child above this level, it is more efficient to bear the social costs than
to prevent or cure the obesity, because this portion of the prevention
cost curve lies above the social cost curve.

OBESITY 18 (May 2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan04004/
efan04004.pdf (“For each race/ethnic group of females, both BMI and weight in pounds have
negative and statistically significant effects on wages.”).
164. See Forrest Lee Andrews, Comment, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on
the Fast Food Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 157 (2004) (“In 1995, ‘total cost[s] (direct
and indirect) attributable to obesity amounted to $99 billion.’”) (quoting OFFICE OF THE
SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL
TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY (2001), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf).
165. It is possible that the prevention cost curve lies entirely above the social cost curve.
That would mean that, for every child, it is more economically efficient to allow the child to be
obese and have that child and society bear the associated costs, than to expend the resources
necessary to prevent or cure obesity in that child. Because data exists for the adult obesity
problem that indicates that the curves do intersect, the likelihood of this occurring is negligible,
and so we may disregard such an arrangement of the curves. Consider those people (whether
few or many) who experience long-term success with programs like Jenny Craig or Weight
Watchers. The total cost of these diet programs includes both the cost of weight reduction (i.e.,
convenient, low-calorie food, as well as counseling, etc.) and a profit for the company. The
successful consumer of such a program has determined that social costs and other costs
associated with his own excess weight exceed the cost of the diet program. For this particular
consumer, the diet program is all that is necessary to cure the obesity, so the cost of curing is less
than the cost of obesity. Therefore, this particular person lies to the left of the intersection of
the curves. On the other hand, those for whom “everything fails”—or at least, those who decide
that the various weight-loss efforts “aren’t worth it”—lie to the right of the intersection,
assuming they are accounting for all the real costs, including health care, associated with
obesity.
OF
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Figure 1. Social and Prevention Cost Curves for Obesity Reduction

Therefore, ideally one might wish to set the per-child penalty so
that it equals the per-child social cost, and the target so that it equals
the “ideal level of performance” as defined by the intersection
point.166 In this way, a participating firm would have a clear financial
incentive to reduce obesity rates efficiently, and when it achieved the
efficient level of reduction, it would find itself not facing any
penalties.
In reality, however, these functions are unknown, so any perchild penalty and target values would only be informed guesses. As
explained so far, our proposal envisions reducing the number of
obese children from 10 million to 5 million. Yet, we admit that we do
not know whether means exist or can be readily developed to achieve
that degree of reduction at a reasonable cost (or, on the other hand,

166. One could argue that a per-child “profit disgorgement” is the proper measure for a
firm’s penalty for failing to cure a child. Such a penalty would be based on the fiction that, had
the firm Acme prevented a child from eating any included products (junk food) during the year,
the child would no longer be obese. Acme could have found some alternative strategy for
eliminating the obese status of the child, but failed to do so. Therefore, the penalty, in a sense,
would force Acme to disgorge the profits reaped from that child’s consumption of junk food
over the course of the year.
Because the child consumed a variety of products, some of which are not made by Acme,
Acme did not literally reap profits from all of that child’s consumption. We, however, have
already accounted for the fact that Acme is only partially to blame for the national food crisis,
and consequently given Acme sole responsibility for only a relatively small number of the obese
children.
In a performance-based system, it makes more sense to base the penalty on total social
cost. This is more in line with the strict liability spirit of this form of regulation, in which
cleaning up the cost an industry imposes on society is the main objective.
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whether 5 million is not an ambitious enough reduction). Moreover,
because we do not know the marginal cost of obesity reduction at the
point where the two curves cross, we do not really know how high to
set the ideal penalty for noncompliance.
Thus, it is important to analyze what outcomes to expect when
our estimates overreach, or fall short of, the values we seek to
approximate.
2. High Penalty and High Target. First imagine a scenario in
which the penalty exceeds the social cost, and the target exceeds the
ideal level of performance. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.
Figure 2. Social and Prevention Cost Curves for Obesity Reduction—
High Penalty, High Target

For each child below the target, the prevention cost is less than
the penalty, so the firm will have an incentive to expend resources to
reduce the obesity of all of these children. Yet it is economically
inefficient to spend resources on some of these children (depicted on
the x-axis in the interval between “ideal level of performance” and
“target”).
3. Low Penalty and High Target. Suppose now that the target
remains at the same level, but that the penalty is set at a lower value
than the social cost. In such a case, the maximum performance that a
firm will shoot for is the level at which the marginal prevention cost
equals the penalty. Because the prevention cost function is increasing,

01__SUGARMAN__SANDMAN.DOC

1472

7/20/2007 1:44 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1403

it will be more expensive to cure the children beyond this level than
to pay the per-child penalty. Hence, the firm will simply elect to pay
the fine for the children represented on the x-axis in the interval
between “maximum expected performance” and “target.”
Figure 3. Social and Prevention Cost Curves for Obesity Reduction—
Low Penalty, High Target

4. Effects of a Low Target. Refer to the diagram in subsection
2. Suppose the penalty remains high compared to the social cost, but
the target is lowered. Following the same logic as in subsection 2, the
firm will expend resources up until it reaches the target, because the
entire portion of the x-axis to the left of the target represents children
for whom it is cheaper to prevent obesity than to pay the penalty.
Therefore, with a high penalty, lowering the target simply truncates
the expected level of performance from the firm.
Now refer to Figure 2. Suppose the penalty remains low
compared to the social cost, but the target is also lowered. Sliding the
target closer to (but still to the right of) the “maximum expected
performance” simply results in fewer penalties incurred by the firm.
The firm will still perform only up to the “maximum expected
performance” location, because for all subsequent children it is
cheaper to pay the penalty. If the target slides down, however, so that
it lies to the left of the “maximum expected performance,” then the
firm will only perform up to the target and then stop, because the
scheme requires nothing more from the firm.
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5. Maximum Expected Performance. We can now give an
expression for the maximum level of performance we can expect for a
given choice of penalty and target, denoted Max(P,T).

The expression < x | PBR(x) = P > denotes the level of
performance, x, for which the associated prevention cost equals the
penalty. We take whichever is the minimum between this value and
the target, because we can expect a rational firm to stop performing
once they reach the target. The diagram in subsection 2 illustrates a
scenario in which the target T is smaller than the intersection point
< x | PBR(x) = P >, and thus the firm performs only up to the target.
By contrast, the diagram in Section 3 illustrates a scenario in which
the intersection point < x | PBR(x) = P > is smaller than the target T,
and so the firm performs only up to this intersection point.
6. Choosing the Penalty and Target. If we cannot accurately
guess what the “ideal level of performance” is, should our proposal
err on the side of a target that is too high, or one that is too low? And
what about the penalty—should it be set too high or too low?
There are two arguments in favor of setting the target and
penalty too high. First, we have already discussed the natural parallels
between a performance-based regulatory system and the system of
strict liability in tort law, showing how PBR is more similar to strict
167
liability than to negligence-based tort law. In a negligence system,
the law aims to require firms to do that which is reasonable. From the
“law and economics” view, “reasonable” means doing only that which
is economically efficient. By contrast, a strict liability system often
demands that firms be responsible for harms that firms cannot (at
present) efficiently avoid.
The classical justifications for imposing strict liability on an
industry also support the proposition that it is better for the industry
to cover too much of the costs it imposes on society rather than too
little. For instance, as between two equally innocent (or equally
culpable) parties—the food manufacturer and the food consumer—
the preference is to shift the cost of injury (i.e., obesity) onto
manufacturers because they are better able to absorb this cost.

167.

See supra Part I.D.2.
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Moreover, they can spread this cost by passing it on to all consumers,
in effect acting like an insurer. Another classical justification that
applies well is the existence of an asymmetry of information between
manufacturers and consumers of food products. The manufacturer
knows exactly what the product contains and has better access to food
scientists and other experts who can determine what effects the
contents are likely to have on consumers. Thus, it is more reasonable
to place on manufacturers the burden of avoiding harm or the cost of
compensating victims. This strict liability way of thinking supports the
idea that that our performance-based regulation should place both
the penalty and the target high so as to promote a high enough level
of performance on the part of the firms, even if such a level ends up
being a bit “too” high.
The second advantage of imposing a high penalty and target
applies only to the first cycle of the regulation. Recall that if the social
cost and prevention cost functions were known in advance, the
regulator could set the penalty and target closer to the ideal. Setting a
very high penalty and target will result in the highest level of firm
performance, because a firm is willing to perform so long as the cost
of performance is less than the cost of the penalty, and it has not yet
met the target. But this also means that, under such circumstances,
the firm progresses furthest along its prevention cost curve, thereby
“discovering” more of the curve than it would have under a lesser
penalty and target. This information is extremely useful to the
168
regulator in determining the desirable levels of penalty and target
for subsequent regulation cycle periods, assuming the program is
continued.
So far, we have suggested a reduction of 5 million obese children
as the proposed target for the PBR scheme. With regard to the
penalty, beyond the recommendation that it be “on the high side,” we
cannot at this time suggest an actual dollar amount. As already
169
discussed, we feel that the program should access the penalty on a
per-child annual basis rather than the per-child lifetime basis used in
Gruber’s proposed remedy for tobacco. The regulator, however,
should compute the actual amount of the penalty after evaluating the
available data on the social cost of obesity. The data will be imperfect,
but it will give a good starting point.

168.
169.

See supra Part IV.G (discussing penalties for fraudulent misreporting of data).
See supra Part IV.F.1.
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Should a Tradable Permits Feature Be Included?

Absent a tradable permits approach, if Acme, for example, is to
avoid penalties at the end of year five, it must have 125,000 fewer
obese children in its assigned schools than it had had at the outset of
the scheme (say, 300,000 instead of 425,000 at the outset). But under a
tradable permits approach, if it were unable to reduce its initial
number sufficiently, it could avoid penalties by “buying” the right to
have more than 300,000 obese children from other regulated firms
that have exceeded their targets (or who could be enticed to do so
with a payment for the permit by Acme).
The economic advantage to this approach is that more efficient
firms will carry larger loads so that society can achieve the 8 percent
overall goal at the lowest cost. So, too, Acme might find that (despite
initial efforts to assign each firm a relatively similar pool of children)
it has wound up with a disproportionately harder to reach set of
children. In that case as well, Acme might find it easier to meet its
target if it can buy permits from firms who have populations that turn
out to be easier to treat.
Furthermore, firms might decide that they want to treat children
in areas other than the ones the program has assigned them. With the
right amount of cash to make the deal work for both sides, firms
might swap the children on whom they focus under a tradable permit
scheme. Acme, for example, might wish to achieve its obesityreduction target in Kentucky even though the program has assigned it
schools in Oregon. But if a deal could be struck with, say, Bell
Corporation that has responsibility for the Kentucky schools, then
Acme would be able to meet its 125,000 fewer obese children target
elsewhere than in Oregon.
Although some of those who favor a PBR approach are likely to
find attractive the further flexibility and potential efficiency gains that
come from introducing the tradable permit feature, others will object.
One likely objection is that this promotes the commoditization of
children to an unacceptable degree. Worse, even though we restricted
the participating schools to those with the highest obesity levels,
among them there will be more and less attractive schools from the
viewpoint of the regulated firms, and this risks creating the equivalent
of the “toxic hot spots” that plague Los Angeles’s RECLAIM
170
program. Finally, many will want the assigned firms to have to stick
170.

See supra Part I.F.2.
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with the children and schools to which they have been matched at the
outset of the program, if for no other reason than this permits the
local community to develop a stable relationship with its responsible
firm (or the group that the regulated firm selects to do the actual
171
obesity reduction work for it ). And although we admit that firms
are quite unlikely to slough off communities with which they have
developed good working relationships, we fear that schools with
better organized and savvier staffs and parents will more quickly
develop those ties, risking leaving behind those schools that may have
the greatest need. After all, the scheme we have put forward requires
at least some cooperation by schools, and perhaps some regulated
firms will try to convince their assigned schools to take a very active
and direct role in the obesity reduction campaign. But schools as
institutions themselves are very different from each other and very
differently positioned to make children’s health a priority, especially
if they are badly failing with the children’s education. (And even if
reduced obesity rates did go hand in hand with higher academic
achievement, actually getting to that outcome can be enormously
more difficult for some schools.) For these reasons, our instinct is not
to include the tradable permit feature as part of our PBR plan,
although we do not consider this a “deal breaker” feature.
J.

How to Proceed

Many public health advocates for reduced childhood obesity
instinctively think first of national solutions spearheaded by the
federal government.172 Consider a changed national school lunch
173
program, controls on television ads aimed at children, and a

171. If Acme swaps schools with Bell, it might want to apply its own consulting firm to the
newly acquired school, rather than retaining the consultants that had previously been working
with the students on behalf of Bell. See infra Part VI.B.
172. Some researchers claim that local legislative measures
have little influence on nationwide industry practices. Statewide legislation has more
potential, although the amount of political compromise required to pass it can reduce
its effectiveness, it is sometimes not enforced due to industry opposition, and it is
often not far-reaching enough to alter the practices of large national or multinational
corporations.
Alderman & Daynard, supra note 10, at 84 (citation omitted).
173. See David Vladeck et al., Commercial Speech and the Public’s Health: Regulating
Advertisements of Tobacco, Alcohol, High Fat Foods and Other Potentially Hazardous Products,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 32, 32 (2004) (“Thus far, a divided Court has generally sided with the
proponents of free commercial speech, sometimes striking down lower court rulings that found
for the public health viewpoint. These cases indicate that the majority of the Court currently
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nationwide requirement that fast-food outlets clearly disclose to
buyers nutritional and calorie information about the items they are
174
selling. But, experience with the tobacco control movement suggests
that greater health gains might occur through policy reform at the
175
state, or even local, level. And, indeed, several obesity-reduction
strategies already have a local focus.176 Think of efforts to rid schools
of bad food in vending machines, to limit the number of fast-food
outlets near schools, and to help small grocers in low-income
communities stock healthy fruits and vegetables.
With respect to PBR, we have been describing our plan so far as
though it would be a national scheme. Yet that may not be necessary
or wise. Just as precursor approaches to NCLB began at the state
level, this might also work well for PBR applied to childhood obesity.
We can certainly imagine applying our plan to the major bad food
sellers in a state like California, for example. We are not concerned
about gaining regulatory jurisdiction over them, and we view the
California market as more than large enough to make feasible the
administration of our proposal. Although some firms might have
significantly different market shares of bad food consumed in
California than elsewhere, we suspect that, in the end, a countrywide
plan would target most of the same national enterprises that would
dominate the list of those regulated in California. Moreover,
California has plenty of schools with high proportions of obese
children in attendance so as to provide a large and important target
for the program.

prefers the First Amendment interests of advertisers over the health and safety goals of
government.”).
174. See Rebecca S. Fribush, Note, Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should
Mandatory Nutritional Disclosure Laws Apply to Restaurant Foods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
377, 379 (2005) (“[R]estaurants with more than a certain number of branches would be required
to make nutritional information easily available to customers through nutrition data sheets or
similar means, but would not be required to put such information directly on menus or menu
boards.”).
175. “Legislative success against the tobacco industry occurred primarily at the local level.”
Alderman & Daynard, supra note 10, at 84. In addition, “[l]ocal public health–related legislation
may have a large impact on a small segment of the population, while litigation may have a
smaller impact on a much larger scale.” Id. at 85.
176. See Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2603 (“As of 2000, 19 taxed foods that are not
nutritious (such as soft drinks and candy). Several other states had such taxes, but repealed
them in the 1990s because of pressure from the affected industries and difficulties
administrating them (for example, some states had difficulty determining which foods met the
definition of a taxable item).”).
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Indeed, viewing states as places in which experiments in
government intervention are conducted, it might make special sense
to adopt PBR in one or a few large states at the outset, leaving other
states to experiment with competing regulatory mechanisms to battle
childhood obesity. This would provide a kind of natural experiment
by which the alternative regulatory approaches could be
comparatively evaluated—although it might be methodologically
difficult to deal with the possibility that impacts of regulatory reform
in some states are spilling over into others.
Whether states have the regulatory capacity to implement PBR is
another matter, although with adequate money for administration, we
do not see this as an insurmountable hurdle in states like California.
There, for example, the state Department of Health Services has
created a reasonably well-funded and effective tobacco control
network.177
Indeed, even at the national level we foresee the need for a
beefed up regulatory apparatus if Congress applies PBR to bad food
providers. Our instinct would be to place the administration of the
program in the FDA (and not the USDA, which seems too long
178
identified, and politically allied, with the food industry). But new
staff, new expertise, and creative leadership will be required to
determine precisely which foods are covered by our plan, which
enterprises are to be regulated, what each firm’s share of the
childhood obesity-reduction target is, what precise schools are the
responsibility of each firm, whether firms are meeting their targets,
what the proper penalties for noncompliance are, and how those
penalties are enforced.
V. POLITICS
A. Reframing the Issue
One of the goals of the PBR approach is to frame childhood
obesity as a problem for which the food industry is importantly
responsible, and not a problem for which families alone are
179
responsible. A good analogy is how NCLB framed low educational

177. See Tobacco Control Section, Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., Welcome to the Tobacco
Control Section Website, http://www.dhs.ca.gov/tobacco (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
178. See NESTLE, supra note 92, at 99–102.
179. A similar approach has been taken elsewhere. See id. at 183 (“The [American Academy
of Pediatrics] recognized that the ultimate control of children’s television viewing rests with
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achievement as an underperforming-school problem rather than a
parenting problem. So, too, applying PBR to cigarettes would
reinforce the perception that youth smoking is something for which
tobacco companies, not parents, are centrally responsible.
Indeed, we hope that merely talking up PBR as a way to attack
childhood obesity will emphasize the role that bad food and
beverages sellers now play in this growing social problem and
facilitate further calls for them to take responsibility for the
consequences of their products. That, in turn, can increase the
possibility that legislatures will intervene in an active way to fight
childhood obesity.
Moreover, given how relatively little is known about just what
interventions are best suited to roll back the recent jump in childhood
obesity, a focus on PBR avoids the pitfall confronting any specific
command-and-control regulatory proposal that the food industry is
sure to attack as unproved. Indeed, to fight PBR, food companies will
probably have to argue that they do not know how to solve the
problem, an unattractive position to hold if the public can first be
convinced that those very firms are centrally the cause of a problem
for which they are now seeking to duck responsibility.
B. Opportunities for Political Entrepreneurs
We hope that PBR is a sufficiently attractive and novel approach
that it can win the attention of some political entrepreneurs who wish
to further their careers by promoting headline-grabbing reforms that
hold promise for making a real difference in solving a serious social
problem.
We also hope that, amid the increasing clamor for some
legislative action on childhood obesity, most likely of the commandand-control sort, PBR can find some bipartisan support. Democrats
could find it attractive because it calls on government to act in a way
that puts the responsibility for the problem on big business. Some
Republicans might conclude that PBR is the better solution as
compared with proposals that would order business to do this or that
specific thing. Our plan has something of the feel of a class action by a
group of plaintiffs against a group of defendants, yet without the

parents and caretakers, but it also called on industry and government to take responsibility for
what gets aired.”).
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litigation features; indeed, as already emphasized, through successful
compliance, regulated firms can altogether avoid financial penalties.
C. Response of the Food Industry
We recognize that food firms are likely to focus their early efforts
on seeing to it that our proposal is not adopted, or, if it is adopted,
then in an ineffectual form. They will probably begin by seeking to
discredit the core idea that this is a problem for the food industry to
solve (i.e., resisting the framing we propose). Food industry
opponents might also claim that PBR is simply impractical, regardless
of its theoretical appeal. Yet, some firms with a longer horizon may
come to appreciate that PBR is a better regime with which to live if
the alternative is command-and-control regulation, especially if
increasing controls are likely to be imposed if early rules do not
quickly provide the socially desired results.
If our PBR idea were to gain legislative momentum, then
potentially impacted firms might focus on modifying its terms, say, by
minimizing the penalties for noncompliance, minimizing the required
reductions in obesity, and/or by extracting some additional beneficial
exceptions and/or favorable definitions. And yet, if the prevalence of
childhood obesity continues to rise, pressure for some sort of
regulation will rise with it, thereby increasingly forcing food
companies to think about less burdensome alternatives.
Moreover, in such a climate, we predict that the food industry
would become increasingly splintered. Healthy food providers will
see an opportunity to gain market share and profit as legal burdens
are placed on bad food sellers. And at least some bad food sellers are
likely to see PBR as an opportunity for them to reformulate their
product in a healthier way so that it will be exempt from the regime,
again offering such firms an opportunity to gain economic advantages
over their competitors.
VI. HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY WOULD IMPLEMENT
PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION
Assume now that our PBR plan is actually put in place. Covered
firms might then respond in several ways. This Part explores both the
bright and dark side of possible implementation strategies and
suggests additional regulatory controls that will be required. We
should reemphasize, however, that the specific ways that the
regulated firms would respond are unpredictable; indeed, the very

01__SUGARMAN__SANDMAN.DOC

2007]

PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION

7/20/2007 1:44 PM

1481

point of PBR is for firms to make those choices and to vary their
response over time as they learn what works best. Nonetheless, we
can make some more generalized points to which the relevant
regulatory body must be attentive.
A. Adopt Potentially Perverse Responses (and How to Block That)
We recognize the risk that firms may respond to PBR in ways
that are socially undesirable. Although performance-based regulation
is intended to give firms wide latitude with respect to what measures
to implement, it is important to have a check in place to guard against
firms using unsavory means to accomplish the desired ends. Firms
that propose or put in place plans that include elements that are
against public policy must be required to revise their plans.
Some red flags include (a) strategies designed not to reduce the
prevalence of childhood obesity, but rather to shift obese children
away from the firm’s assigned schools; (b) strategies that would have
socially unacceptable consequences for obese, or near-obese, children
(like shaming them or denying them educational opportunities); (c)
strategies that would insist on socially unacceptable intrusions into
the bodies of obese, or near-obese, children (like requiring them to
submit to surgery or drugs); and (d) strategies that would cause
children to become undernourished and/or excessively skinny. If a
firm proceeds to implement a disapproved method, it will incur a
substantial financial penalty.
In addition to deliberately perverse responses by regulated firms,
there is the risk of unintended and undesired consequences. Suppose,
for example, obesity rates were reduced, but educational attainment
was sacrificed; or suppose teens wound up engaging in socially
unacceptable conduct as a way of reaching individual weight goals
(like smoking cigarettes, sweating off pounds just before weigh-ins,
and the like).
We also appreciate that any campaign against childhood obesity
could well stigmatize some children who become obese, even if, for
some of them, becoming so is largely outside of their control. This is
somewhat like the problem the tobacco control movement faces when
it inevitably stigmatizes addicted smokers. In the end, this is perhaps
a socially inevitable price to be paid by public health campaigns
against what are seen as “behavioral” public health problems like
smoking and obesity.
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To minimize these various undesirable consequences, the
regulatory body supervising the PBR plan would have the authority
to veto objectionable features of any firm’s plan as implemented.
Beyond that, the regulators could also conduct random audits of the
regulated firms and engage the cooperation of the participating
schools (say, through whistle-blower rewards) in policing socially
unacceptable implementation measures. And, the regulatory agency
might also engage in affirmative educational efforts to prevent the
social isolation of obese persons.
A different problem is that, in response to our PBR plan, some
firms might decide to “fake it.” For example, they might adopt a
superficial “plan” to satisfy the first year planning requirement of the
regulation and then, rather than really doing anything to achieve their
target, they would simply set aside money to pay the penalties. By
cavalierly paying penalties instead of trying to achieve their targets,
these firms might hope to discredit PBR as an ineffective mechanism
for achieving reduced levels of childhood obesity.
There would be risks to firms in taking this approach, however.
First, were PBR to fail, this could lead to even more objectionable
command-and-control regulation over the food industry. Second, this
sort of “slacking” might be foolishly wasteful—especially if success
stories appear in which other firms reduce obesity rates at costs well
below the penalty level. Therefore, even if the regulatory agency
might not be able to do much formally to combat “fakers,” there is
reason to hope that most firms would not adopt this sort of high-risk
approach.
Still other worries about our proposal concern the fear that
participating firms will get too involved with the lives of the pool of
children for which they are responsible. Some people may be
bothered that our program will invade children’s privacy or diminish
parental authority. Some people may dread that schools will actually
become more commercialized and that children will develop brand
loyalty to those very sellers of “bad” food who will be in their schools
supposedly looking after their dietary health. Although we do not
share this trepidation, once more we think that the solution lies in
allowing the regulatory agency in charge to veto what would be
widely understood to be socially unacceptable plan features.
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B. Buy or Make?
Instead of marshalling their own internal resources in an effort to
achieve their assigned target, some firms might farm out the task of
reducing childhood obesity to independent, outside firms that would
come to specialize in this work. Indeed, it is possible that such firms
might take on the job on a contingent payment basis. Thinking back
to the Acme example, Acme will realize that because it is supposed to
reduce childhood obesity by the end of year five by 125,000 children,
it will face a penalty of $Y per child if it achieves no reduction at all.
And if Acme decides that it would cost the company more than $Y
per child to achieve any reduction itself, it will realize that it will be
better off if it can pay some other party less than $Y for each
reduction that the other party achieves. Moreover, among firms
seeking to do this work, there should be an incentive to compete to
do it most efficiently, thereby bidding the price charged to Acme
lower and lower.
By contrast, other firms would “personally” embrace the duties
imposed by the regulation, by investing in in-house research and
development of ways to address childhood obesity.
Whether an individual firm goes the contracting-out route (which
we term the “buy” obesity reduction strategy) or the do-it-in-house
route (which we term the “make” strategy), we predict that a new
industry180 of obesity-prevention consulting firms is likely to emerge.
As already suggested, these firms would perhaps themselves take on
the financial risk of obesity reduction if many firms pursue the “buy”
route and pay only contingent on success. But even for firms that
more formally follow the in-house “make” route, firms are likely to
turn to obesity consultants to help them strategize as to how to
engage the schools with whom they are paired, to provide expert
advice as to which reduction strategies are proving most effective, to
provide in-house training, and to help with monitoring and evaluation
efforts so that regulated firms will know in advance how much they
are spending, whether they are succeeding, and what financial
penalties, if any, loom.
This likely development of obesity-reduction specialist firms has
disadvantages as well as advantages. The main plus is likely to be that
greater specialization will lead to greater expertise and greater
success. In addition, the consulting firm may be in a better position
180.

Or, one spun off from the existing weight-loss industry.
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than the participating firm to accomplish its singular goal, given that
the latter would have the dual conflicting goals of obesity prevention
181
Finally, the consulting firm would enjoy
and product sales.
economies of scale by serving multiple clients and therefore multiple
sets of schools.
On the other hand, such economies of scale may come with a
price, because, if the actual “doers” are a few players, our proposal
then risks losing out on some of the benefits of experimentation.
Additionally, although the farming out of obesity prevention may
alleviate the food firm’s burden of having dual goals, it might impose
a different sort of conflict on the consulting firms. If a consultant
represents more than one food firm, it might represent business rivals,
182
which could cause some difficulty for the consultant. Yet, we do not
find this prospect terribly bothersome because food firms are already
used to dealing with potential conflicts among advertising firms who
might represent competitors. In the end, a perhaps greater concern
would be that, to play it safe, inside managers at regulated food firms
would cluster their business around a small number of superpower
consultant firms, choosing the consultant based largely on its client
list, hoping thereby to have a ready excuse to higher management if
the firm does not meet its obesity-reduction target.
Whether firms “buy” or “make,” they are likely to employ quite
different strategies in involving the assigned schools themselves in
their implementation plans. Some firms might only deal with the
schools in what we will assume would be their assigned role of
measuring their enrolled children for obesity each year. In such
schools, firms would deal directly with students and their families.
Other firms might seek to have the schools themselves become the
places where students (and their parents) are approached and
engaged; some may well seek the active participation of school
personnel. This, of course, will require that the firms win the

181. Of course, the food industry firm that farms out the task still has a goal of selling
product, which may be in tension with the firm’s second goal of getting its money’s worth from
the consulting firm. That is, the firm still wants to sell product and to prevent obesity. However,
upon farming out the job, the tension between the two goals is attenuated because the goal
pursuers are separated. Therefore, neither will be paralyzed in pursuing its primary goal due to
a fear of adversely impacting its secondary goal.
182. For instance, because a person may eat a little “bad” food, it is conceivable that a
consultant hired by Mars, Inc. could advise children to simply cut salty snacks out of their diet
(i.e., M&Ms once in a while are okay). Conversely, a consultant hired by Frito-Lay could advise
children to avoid sweets.
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cooperation of their schools, which might come from providing
resources to schools, or perhaps simply by showing schools that they
can more easily achieve educational goals with healthier students (a
“win-win” solution).
C. Getting Them Slim Versus Keeping Them Slim
When it comes to obesity, it may well be that an ounce of poundprevention is worth a pound of cure. Many people conceive of the
obesity question as, How do we help obese people slim down to a
healthy weight? If one is concerned about a particular obese
individual, then that is indeed the right question. Across a population,
however, preventing the onset of obesity may be the more effective
and economical approach. In a technical sense, this is especially true
for the problem of childhood obesity, because the “turnover rate” of
childhood to adulthood is rapid and reliable.
Suppose Acme is responsible for a set of schoolchildren that
includes Adam, a currently obese seventeen-year-old, and Bobby, a
slender eight-year-old with a higher-than-average likelihood of later
becoming obese. It may be that Acme would prefer to forego
expending resources to get Adam to shed weight. First of all,
preventing Bobby’s weight gain may be easier and cheaper than
helping Adam lose weight. Second, regardless of whether Acme
succeeds or fails to slim Adam down, Acme only receives one year’s
worth of penalty or reward, because Adam is about to age out of the
system anyway. Bobby, on the other hand, can be a success for Acme
for the next ten years if it manages to keep him slim. (Indeed, for
those who will age out of the program before the end of the fifth year
when the real penalties come into play, participating firms will have
little incentive directly to lower the children’s obesity rate, as success
with them will be ignored when the penalty-imposing time comes.)
Put generally, whenever resources are finite, choices have to be
made. Thus, one could argue that viewing the regulation scheme as a
population-wide prevention movement is sensible—even if that
effectively requires “writing off” some students. In any event, this
perspective leads us to predict that regulated firms are more likely to
focus on the potentially obese as compared with the already obese, on
the younger rather than the older, and, to the extent they do focus on
the already obese, on the slightly obese rather than the substantially
obese. Although all of this has distributional consequences that might
bother some, from our perspective the key point remains that the
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plan’s success in cutting the childhood obesity rate in half in ten years
would count as an enormous social gain. Moreover, experience
gained during the first cycle with both PBR generally and with its
application to childhood obesity specifically could help us to revise
the plan’s parameters for a second cycle if that were thought wise.
D. Seeing Performance-Based Regulation as a Public Relations
Opportunity
Firms like McDonald’s, as well as organizations like the National
Association of Soft Drink Manufacturers, claim that obesity is not
caused by the inherent nature of their products but rather by a
183
sedentary lifestyle combined with overconsumption. Our proposal,
in a sense, affords firms an opportunity to confirm this theory by
coming up with creative solutions to the obesity problem that do not
necessarily entail eliminating their products from the diets of
American youth. And, by achieving their targets, firms are likely to
tout these social gains in the way they publicize other social
achievements—like selection as one of the best places for employees
to work.
On a public relations level, firms may also prefer this regulatory
scheme to the alternatives. Consider traditional tort law, for example.
If the obesity problem were addressed through existing tort law, a
judgment would run against a particular firm, including a finding of
fault on the part of that firm. Any remedial action ordered by the
court, or simply undertaken by the firm in response to a judgment,
might appear to the public as a wrongdoer taking its lumps. By
contrast, the regulatory scheme we have proposed simultaneously
charges many firms with the task of helping to solve a societal
problem. Thus, instead of viewing vanquished defendants as a few
bad apples, the public may see the group of regulated firms as active
guardians of children’s health, rolling up their sleeves and coming up
184
with imaginative solutions.

183. See Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1733–41.
184. See Charles F. Sabel & Michael C. Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283–84 (1998) (“The foundation of [an] architecture
[of institutionalized democratic deliberation] would be a new connection between the broad
pronouncements of the legislature and the courts, and applications of these pronouncements to
particular situations. This connection would have to leave room for experimental elaboration
and revision to accommodate varied and changing circumstances, yet credibly limit the
opportunities for self-dealing that this very openness of necessity seems to create.”).
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Similarly, with respect to public relations, firms may also prefer
performance-based regulation to command and control, because
command-and-control regulation is likely to reflect badly on the food
product itself. For example, suppose regulations require the CocaCola Company to remove Coke from school vending machines. This
would imply that Coke is a bad product that youths should not
consume.
In addition, compliance with a PBR scheme such as ours looks
much more proactive than compliance with participation-based
schemes. This is especially the case once a firm starts getting results
under a PBR scheme, as such results make a better impression on the
public than merely announcing that a firm is conferring with
consumer advocates. Even if a firm took action based on the
suggestions of the community, the firm then has less leeway, as
compared to PBR, to structure the solutions so that they do not
disparage the firm’s product.
Another public relations benefit inuring to firms is that in-school
advertising would become more legitimate. Some firms are already
185
which many people find
filling schools with advertising,
186
inappropriate, and yet schools are loath to reject the financial
rewards of permitting it.187 Under our scheme, with a school’s
cooperation, a firm could proudly sponsor a “fun run,” a basketball
tournament, or a variety of other healthful events and information
sessions.188 Not only would this type of branding be less offensive, but
it would actually create community goodwill for the firm.

185. NESTLE, supra note 92, at 188 (“A General Accounting Office investigation found it
difficult to distinguish commercial from noncommercial activities in schools because such
intrusion into everyday life is so intrinsic to U.S. society. The study noted that many commercial
activities . . . produced no tangible benefits for the schools, although the benefits to advertisers
were quite evident.”).
186. Id. at 191 (“[O]rganizations such as the Center for Commercial-Free Public Education
(Oakland, California) and the Center for Analysis of Commercialism in Education (University
of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) . . . publicize the most blatant conflicts of interest in books and
articles, file petitions with state legislatures, encourage lawmakers to ask for investigations and
to introduce bills restricting commercial activities in schools, and demand that marketers stop
advertising on Channel One. By 2001, their efforts were gaining increasing publicity and
support.”).
187. Id. (“Opposition to school commercialism is unlikely to come from financially strapped
school officials grateful for whatever help they can get . . . .”).
188. Currently, “[m]arketing methods that target children at school” include “Channel
One”; “Soft drink ‘pouring-rights’ agreements; Logos on vending machines, supplies, and sports
facilities; Hallway advertising; Advertisements on free book covers; Advertisements on school
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VII. ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE-BASED STRATEGIES?
Our proposal is designed to press the food industry to reduce
childhood obesity. We recognize, however, that one could imagine
using PBR to attack the problem in other ways. Yet, we find those
alternatives less desirable.
For example, PBR could set the “output” target differently.
Suppose that, instead of fewer obese children, the goal was a
reduction in the amount or proportion of “bad” food sold. Imagine
that firms whose products now qualify them for inclusion in our plan
(their products contain 40 percent or more sugar or 30 percent or
more fat) were told to cut their sales of such food in half. This would
be analogous to using PBR to tell power companies to cut their toxic
emissions in half. The food companies subject to the regulation would
be left to decide how to achieve their target—reformulate their
products, reduce sales of their existing products, or some
combination.
We, however, find this PBR scheme considerably less attractive
than our proposal. For one thing, it in no way ensures fewer obese
children, which is the real public health goal after all. For another, it
might mean depriving responsible people of food and drink items,
when such people only consume those potentially dangerous products
in moderate, and hence not unhealthy, amounts. There is no
assurance that the reduced consumption required by this version of
PBR would come from those who consume too much.189
A different approach would be to continue to focus on childhood
obesity reduction as the output target, but to make parties other than
the food industry responsible for achieving the goal. Earlier we
mentioned the possibility of targeting other industries, such as those
that entice youths into a sedentary lifestyle.190 But, even more
radically, what if parents or schools were the regulated parties?
We also find this strategy less attractive than ours. Perhaps most
importantly, it is sharply at odds with the reframing goal of our
proposal, which is to cast substantial responsibility for the childhood
obesity problem onto the food industry. Also, penalizing families and
buses; Sports uniforms; Scoreboards; Contests; Free samples; Coupons for fast food; Club and
activity sponsorship; [and] Product placements in teaching materials.” Id. at 187 tbl.20.
189. For similar reasons, we also find less appealing a PBR scheme that would set a firm’s
target in terms of the amount of exercise engaged in by the children in its pool, rather than their
ultimate obesity rate as under our proposal.
190. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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schools for failing to achieve plan goals would be morally troubling—
especially because, at the individual family level, genetic
predisposition may confront some parents with a near-impossible
task. Perhaps nearly equivalent progress could be achieved were
parents and/or schools rewarded for achieving obesity reduction
goals. Yet, were it true that financially rewarding parents or schools
for keeping fit the children who are in their charge could sharply
reduce childhood obesity, then firms subject to the PBR scheme we
propose could decide on their own to employ this mechanism.
A still different approach would be not to penalize bad food
sellers for failing to reduce childhood obesity, but instead to reward
financially firms that do achieve a reduction. Apart from the
objection that this would, in effect, be paying business to undo harms
it has traditionally created, it is not obvious how these incentive
payments would be targeted. Who would be responsible for which
children and how would success be measured? One possibility would
be to have firms bid to take responsibility for the obesity rates of
children in specified blocks of schools. The higher bidder would, in
effect, “win” the contract. Winning bidders would initially pay the
government money, but if they were successful, they would earn
considerably more back than they tendered. Winning bidders need
not be “bad” food sellers. But, once again, if this turns out to be a
good strategy, then “bad” food sellers under our proposal could
auction off responsibility for “their schools” in the same way.
We believe that the same points would apply were PBR applied
to states. For example, bad food could be taxed and the proceeds
used to provide payments to states that achieve obesity reduction
targets. States could learn from each other, and they would have an
extra incentive to lower obesity rates if there were financial rewards
for doing so. Those rewards could partly pay for, or perhaps more
than pay for, the cost of their obesity-reduction efforts. States,
broadly speaking, would take the place of the large food companies
who would be subject to PBR in our proposal. Yet, once again, if it
turns out that it makes sense to rely on states to organize and
implement effective obesity-prevention/reduction campaigns, the
firms in our scheme can more or less achieve that solution by
contract. On the other hand, relying on governments (as under
NCLB) means turning to bodies that are not as accustomed to dealing
with financial incentives as the private sector, and giving up on using
PBR to reframe childhood obesity as importantly the responsibility of
the food industry.
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CONCLUSION
We concede that many difficulties confront the implementation
of our proposed scheme to reduce childhood obesity through
performance-based regulation. Perhaps the largest is the political
challenge of passing the necessary legislation. In addition,
implementing and overseeing such a regulatory scheme will require a
lot of information, attention, and funding. Yet, the costs and
challenges of the proposal should not be analyzed in a vacuum.
Because the epidemic of childhood obesity is spreading and
becoming ever graver—as epidemics are wont to do—the government
is likely to take action in one form or another. The health problems to
which obese children are predisposed will cost them (and society)
dearly and in increasing amounts for many years to come. Indeed,
because of the latency period between obesity onset in childhood and
the longer-term health problems faced by its victims, society has not
yet begun to see the true medical and other costs associated with this
growing condition. As a result, it is essential that the cost of
regulating be measured against the cost of not regulating.
So too, the morality of regulating the food industry should be
assessed in light of the morality of doing nothing. Opponents of
utilizing PBR in this context will tout freedom of choice and personal
responsibility as justifications for shielding the food industry from
accountability for the childhood obesity problem. Children
themselves, however, are not responsible for their choices, and we
believe there is a growing appreciation that parents cannot be
expected to battle their children all day, every day, in an effort to
counteract the powerful and undeniable effects of the food industry’s
marketing ploys.
The parallels between the food and tobacco industries have not
escaped notice, and legal and public health experts are working to
analyze whether “Big Food” can be brought to the mat using the tools
that have been applied or proposed for confronting “Big Tobacco.”
In sum, for many of the same reasons advanced by advocates of PBR
in the context of youth smoking, we believe that the problem of
childhood obesity is amenable to a solution in which performancebased regulation plays a critical role.

